No such thing as shovel-ready projects
On September 27th the President told Peter Baker of The New York Times:
He realized too late that “there’s no such thing as shovel-ready projects” when it comes to public works.
Yet just three weeks earlier, in a speech to the LaborFest in Milwaukee, the President said:
So, that’s why, Milwaukee, today, I am announcing a new plan for rebuilding and modernizing America’s roads and rails and runways for the long term.
… But the bottom line is this, Milwaukee — this will not only create jobs immediately, it’s also going to make our economy hum over the long haul.
Q1 for Team Obama: If there’s no such thing as shovel-ready projects, how will the $50 B of new infrastructure spending create jobs immediately?
Q2: If shovel-ready projects do exist and are queued up to create jobs immediately, shouldn’t they have been funded already by the stimulus law enacted in early 2009, leaving only the slower-spending projects left to be funded with the new money?
Q3: Given the President’s admission, isn’t the President’s proposal simply a deficit-financed increase in government spending with no immediate macroeconomic benefit?
Election season should not excuse the Administration from justifying its proposals as sound policy.
(photo credit: Office of Governor Patrick)
The President’s misleading deficit attack
Here’s the President, speaking yesterday in Richmond, Virginia:
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I’m not a math teacher. (Laughter.) But I know a little bit about math. They’re proposing about $4 trillion worth of tax cuts. About $700 billion of those tax cuts are for people who typically are millionaires and billionaires, and on average would get $100,000 in tax relief — $700 billion that we don’t have, we’d have to borrow in order to provide these tax cuts. And 98 percent of Americans wouldn’t see any benefit from it.
And keep in mind that because we don’t have it, it would actually end up costing more than $700 billion, because we’d end up having — since we’re borrowing it, we’d have to pay interest on it.
… So when you add it all up, essentially their proposal would drastically expand the deficit instead of shrinking it.
The President uses two aggregate numbers: “about $4 trillion worth of tax cuts” and “more than $700 billion.” In both cases these are 10-year totals.
What the President didn’t say is that he and Republicans basically agree on the other $3.1 trillion of “tax cuts,” which I think of as preventing tax increases.
If the President thinks that Republicans are irresponsible for proposing $700 B of “tax cuts” that he opposes because of the deficit effect, why is he OK with the other $3.1 trillion of deficit effect?
The President says “… $700 billion that we don’t have.” Presumably he thinks “we have” $3 trillion but not the additional $700 billion.
Did he make a judgment that, relative to current law, it’s OK to increase the deficit by $3.1 trillion, but not by $3.8 trillion?
If he did that’s actually a legitimate policy position to defend. But the way the President describes it, Congressional Republicans are the only ones whose policies would make the deficit higher than current law.
That’s not true, to the tune of $3.1 trillion over the next decade.
Here is what I think is a fair description of the two positions:
- The President wants to change the law to prevent tax increases on individuals who earn up to $200K per year, and on families who earn up to $250K per year. In addition he wants to change the law to prevent other tax increases that I won’t describe here. If the President’s proposal were to become law, over the next decade the federal government would take in about $3.1 trillion less revenue than it would under current law, and deficits would be the same amount higher.
- Congressional Republicans agree with the President’s proposals, but they insist that tax increases also be prevented on individuals and families (some of whom are small business owners) with incomes above the President’s thresholds. If the Congressional Republican proposal were to become law, over the next decade the federal government would take in about $3.8 trillion less revenue than it would under current law, and deficits would be the same amount higher.
- The difference between the two positions is about $700 billion over the next decade.
Note also the President’s use of the phrase “$700 billion that we don’t have” to mean “the government has tax revenue that it shouldn’t give to people.”
As I wrote last month:
In this view of the world, revenues belong to the government and are allocated by policymakers as gifts to those who need or deserve them. When you hear that “we cannot afford to cut taxes” and “we should not give tax cuts to ______,” you are hearing this philosophy.
… You can learn a lot about how an elected official approaches spending, taxes, and deficits by listening to how he or she uses the pronoun “we” and whether he or she refers to “paying for government spending” or “paying for spending and tax cuts.”
(photo credit: White House)
The President discusses housing in Albuquerque
Yesterday the President spoke about the economy at a “backyard discussion” in Albuquerque. He made some interesting comments on housing which I’m going to analyze today.
I like when the President does unscripted Q&A because I can learn how he thinks about an issue and sometimes figure out how his advisors have briefed him. This is one of those cases.
I will intersperse my observations within the President’s long comment. You might be surprised at how much I agree with the President’s remarks on this topic. I know I was.
Q: And I guess my question is, what are we doing to prevent people from losing their homes?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the housing crisis helped to trigger the financial crisis.
I agree. There’s a difference between “trigger” and “cause.” I think trigger is right.
THE PRESIDENT: And it’s a complicated story, but essentially what happened was, banks started seeing money in peddling what looked like these very low-interest-rate mortgages, no money down. Started peddling these things to folks. A lot of people didn’t read the fine print, where they had adjustable-rate mortgages or balloon payments, and they ended up being in situations where they were in homes that they couldn’t necessarily afford.
Close but not quite. Mortgage brokers were providing much of the increased volume of new mortgages, especially adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) to “subprime” borrowers. Some banks were on the front end of this increased volume, but to just say banks is incomplete and a bit inaccurate.
With the word “peddling” the President emphasizes the theme of unscrupulous and shady lenders taking advantage of unwitting and uneducated borrowers. This is correct in many cases but it’s far from the whole story. Your bailed-out neighbor with the home-equity-withdrawal-financed boat in his driveway is another part of the story, and he knew exactly what he was doing. I wonder if the questioner wants the government to subsidize that knowing neighbor as well as the unsuspecting lending victim. In practice a government policy cannot easily distinguish between the two.
I also wonder how much we should excuse from responsibility a borrower who “didn’t read the fine print.” If you’re borrowing several hundred thousand dollars from someone, I think you should read and make sure you understand the fine print. Similarly, I hold the view that you are primarily responsible for figuring out how much home you can afford, not your lender. Your lender has an obligation to disclose and explain the terms of the loan, to provide you with complete and accurate information, and to not deceive you. We didn’t have strong enough rules in place to require that, and we now know that was a mistake. At the same time, if the borrower has complete and accurate information, it is his responsibility to act in a financially prudent manner.
Please don’t think I’m excusing or minimizing the importance of corrupt and shady mortgage brokers and in some cases bankers – there were some really bad actors who helped create this problem.
THE PRESIDENT: The banks made a whole bunch of money on all these mortgages that were being generated. But what happened was — is that when the housing market started going down, then all these financial instruments that were built on a steady stream of payments for mortgages, they all went bust, and that helped to trigger the entire crisis.
True, but again he’s incomplete with “the banks.” Many firms and players at all points along the financial chain “made a whole bunch of money on all these mortgages that were being generated.” The banks were part of this chain, as were the mortgage brokers who initiated the loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that securitized many of them, as well as hedge funds, insurance companies, pension funds, university endowments, foreign investors, and everyone else who bought securities derived from these mortgages. Bankers are a more attractive political target than, say, pension funds or university endowments. The President’s statement is correct but incomplete, and in a politically convenient way.
The President says “when the housing market started going down … they all went bust, and that helped to trigger the entire crisis.” This isn’t quite right. Even before home prices started to decline, there were problems caused by the terms of Adjustable Rate Mortgages. Many subprime ARMs had a low fixed teaser rate for the first 2-3 years, after which the interest rate would “reset” upwards. Those borrowers who understood what they were buying hoped that their home would appreciate in value during that first 2-3 years, allowing them to refinance into a fixed rate mortgage before the interest rate reset, using the higher home value as equity to support the new mortgage. The President is therefore correct that housing prices were an important factor in the collapse in value of housing-related assets, but again it’s not the whole story. That story begins with interest rate resets in subprime ARMs.
We therefore had (1) housing problems triggered by the terms of a particular type of mortgage, and (2) housing problems caused by local housing construction bubbles bursting. (1) and (2) interacted – as subprime ARM homeowners began to default, it drove down the prices of their neighbors’ homes and amplified broader housing price declines. These two problems are interrelated, but they’re not the same problem. As an example, there were subprime ARM default problems in Michigan where there was a weak regional economy but almost no housing construction bubble.
THE PRESIDENT: So the housing issue has been at the heart of the economic crisis that we’re in right now. It is a big problem because part of what happened over the last several years is, is that we built more homes than we had families to absorb them. And what’s happened now is, is that housing values have declined around the country, in some places worse than others. In Nevada, in Arizona, they’ve been very badly hit. In New Mexico, I don’t think we had the same bubble, and so prices have not been as badly affected here. But overall across the country, housing lost a lot of value.
This part is really good: “We built more homes than we had families to absorb them.” He’s absolutely right. The problem was not just mortgages, it was the actual buildings we live in. We had a housing bubble in some markets, and we still have an oversupply of homes relative to demand. As long as supply >> demand, prices will fall. That’s why I was taught by experts to watch the inventory of unsold homes. As long as that inventory remains significantly higher than the historic average, we still have an imbalance and the housing market won’t recover.
The President also knows which housing markets saw the biggest bubbles. Kudos to his staff. The big four were California, Nevada, Arizona and Florida. I still have seen no good explanation of why these four markets were so much more extreme than others.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, this is a multitrillion-dollar market, so there’s no government program where we can just make sure that whoever is losing their home that we can just pick up the tab and make sure that they can pay. And frankly there are some people who really bought more home than they could afford, and they’d be better off renting, or they’re going to have to make adjustments in terms of their house.
This part is excellent. The President is right – the housing market is so big that we can’t bail out every homeowner who lost value. And while the President is gentle about it, I can be more direct since I’m not in campaign mode. I don’t think the government should bail out someone who bought a bigger house than they can afford, especially if they had no down payment. I think doing so is unfair to the taxpayers who finance that bailout, and unfair to responsible homeowners who didn’t borrow recklessly.
THE PRESIDENT: What we have tried to do, though, is to make sure that people who had been making their payments regularly, who are meeting their responsibilities, if they could have a little bit of an adjustment with the banks, if some of the principal was reduced, if some of the interest was reduced on their mortgage payment, they could keep on making payments. The bank would be better off than if the home was foreclosed on, obviously they’d be better off, and as the housing market starts picking back up again — which it will do over time, although not in the same trajectory as it used to, right; it’s going to be more much gradual — then potentially the bank could recoup some of the money that it had lost by making the adjustments on the mortgages.
This is correct in theory, and every reporter can find cases where this is true and makes sense. But it’s really hard to scale this up. Also, advocates for these policies often conflate their justifications – should we do this because we want to help these particular homeowners, or because we believe doing so will have broader benefits for the economy?
I feel empathy for the homeowner hoodwinked into a ARM by an unscrupulous mortgage broker. To the extent we believe that many borrowers were unfairly surprised by their interest rate resets from deceptive lenders, and to the extent we feel some governmental responsibility for that surprise / bad news, then it makes sense to help them. This is the genuinely deserving case that the media likes to show us, leading us to mistakenly conclude that everyone at risk of losing his home is a victim deserving of taxpayer help.
Depending on the numbers, I can be comfortable using some taxpayer funds to help move that person into a more affordable mortgage. But since we can’t distinguish between this deserving case and the savvy-for-profit-flipper, any subsidy program will also mean we’re subsidizing people whom we all can agree don’t deserve empathy or subsidies. This is a thorny problem to which there’s no easy answer.
Then we get to the place where I disagree not just with the President’s comment, but with much of the accepted wisdom in Washington about which homeowners we should help. Remember that a homeowner with a fixed rate mortgage doesn’t see his monthly mortgage payments change, even if the market value of his home drops so far that he is underwater on his mortgage.
Example: At the height of the housing bubble, Fred bought a $500,000 Florida home with a $475,000 fixed rate mortgage. He has been making fixed monthly mortgage payments since he moved in. Now the Florida housing bubble has collapsed.Fred has $450,000 left on his mortgage, but today he could sell his home for at most $400,000. He is “underwater” $50,000, and it will take years for him to recoup that loss.
Many in Washington want to subsidize Fred, to bail him out. Some talk about paying the lender to reduce the principal on his mortgage. Others want to force his lender to write down the value of his mortgage. But while Fred has taken an enormous paper loss, he is at zero risk of involuntarily losing his home. Since his mortgage is fixed rate, his monthly mortgage payments haven’t changed, so he’s not at risk of foreclosure. He is no worse off than his cousin George in Iowa who lost $100K investing in tech stocks back in the late 90s. In fact, Fred has an option that George did not have – if he wants he can default on his mortgage, leave the house to the bank, and take the long-term hit to his credit rating. That sucks for Fred, but that’s an option George the bad-stock-investor didn’t have.
Note also the President’s “If they could have a little bit of an adjustment with the banks” language. When you look at borrowers you can divide them into three groups: (1) those who don’t need help to stay in their home, (2) those on the bubble who cannot afford to keep their home without help, but could with just a little bit of assistance, and (3) those who would need so much help from the bank or taxpayers that it’s unreasonable to assume they can ever dig out. You don’t want to spend money on group (1), and money spent on group (3) is a waste. So you try to target your policies at just group (2). That’s hard to do.
THE PRESIDENT: So we’ve set up a number of these mortgage modification programs that are out there. But I don’t want to lie to you — we’ve probably had hundreds of thousands of people who’ve been helped by it. I think there have been a couple of million who’ve applied. But that doesn’t meet the entire need because this is such a huge housing market.
Translation: The quantitative results for these mortgage modification programs are terrible. In the President’s defense, we the Bush team didn’t have much success in this either. It’s very hard for government to effectively influence mortgage modification on a large scale. Q: If a program is directionally correct and politically useful, but ineffective and inefficient with taxpayer dollars, and if you cannot design a better alternative, do you continue it or kill it?
THE PRESIDENT: And what really is probably the most important thing I can do right now to keep people in their homes is to make sure the economy is growing so that they don’t feel job insecurity. That’s probably the thing that’s going to strengthen the housing market the most over the next couple of years. If we’ve got a growing economy, unemployment is gradually being reduced, then people are going to feel more confident; they’re going to be able to make their mortgage payments; new — homeowners, people who are potentially buyers of homes, are going to say, you know what, I don’t mind entering the market because I think things have sort of bottomed out — that starts lifting prices and that gets us on a virtuous cycle instead of a negative cycle.
Good again, but I’d add something else. The foreclosure prevention programs and other housing-related interventions are helping some people keep their homes. At the same time, these programs have the side effect of slowing down the painful but necessary adjustment in housing supply. Especially after witnessing the past three years of struggling housing policy interventions, I lean toward applying the Band-Aid philosophy. Every child knows there are two ways to pull off a Band-Aid: slow and really fast. And every child learns that really fast means less total pain, but it’s scary and difficult to do.
It would be painful in the short run and politically risky to stop intervening in housing markets and let housing prices continue to fall until the excess housing supply is finally bought by bargain hunters. But once this happens we’ll be back on a gradual upward trend. It may be better for us to get the pain out of the way as quickly as possible so the healing can begin, rather than trying to artificially “bridge the gap” with ineffective policies, in hopes that we can protect a few more tens of thousands of homeowners from losing their homes. Dozens of smart people have suggested alternative policies to avoid or mitigate further housing price declines, and there is an argument that government needs to intervene to stop a self-reinforcing downward spiral. I don’t buy this argument.
This is a harsh numbers game with no easy answers. My instinct is for government to stop trying to fix the problem and just let the darn housing market find its natural bottom. I think this means more pain now, but less total pain over time. I think the recovery will come sooner and stronger if we stop trying to patch the housing market and get the painful adjustment behind us.
THE PRESIDENT: But it’s going to take some time. We’re working our way out of overbuilding in the housing market, a lot of not very sensible financial arrangements in the housing market. And we’ve got to get back to sort of a traditional, more commonsense way of thinking about housing which is, if you want a house you got to save for a while. You got to wait until you have 20 percent down. You should go for a mortgage that you know you can afford. You’ve got to — there shouldn’t be any surprises out there, right? That kind of traditional thinking about saving and thinking about the house not as something that is always going up 20 percent every year and you’re going to flip and take out home equity loans and all that — we’ve got to have a different attitude, which reflects what you talked about, more of an attitude that this is your home. This is not just a way to make quick money.
I strongly agree with the President here. I hope he’s willing to tell Members of his party that this means they have to stop insisting that the Federal Housing Administration facilitate zero down payment loans and seller-funded down payments. All homeowners need to have some skin in the game, even if this means that some people won’t be able to afford to buy homes. Certain important Congressional Democrats are the roadblock here.
While at the beginning of his answer the President focused on unscrupulous lenders, here he focuses on the gamblers/flippers. This is a different thought process than the “Banks did it to the people” model with which he began. I think there’s some truth in both stories.
I’m impressed by the depth of the President’s understanding and his thought process. I disagree with his Administration’s policies in many cases, and that includes his housing policies, but I think he gave a good answer yesterday in this Albuquerque backyard conversation.
(photo credit: Moth)
What is a continuing resolution?
The new federal fiscal year begins at 12:01 AM Friday, October 1st.
Much of the federal government is funded through twelve annual appropriations bills.
If an appropriations bill that funds part of the federal government is not enacted before the new fiscal year begins, that part of the government shuts down except for essential employees.
While the House has passed two of the twelve bills, the Senate has passed zero. Most of the federal government will therefore shut down early Friday morning.
It is not unusual for the Congress to fail to enact all 12 appropriations laws before October 1st. It is quite unusual to not have even tried to pass a single one by this time. This is related to the House and Senate majority’s inability (or refusal) to pass a budget resolution back in the spring, and in my view it represents a fundamental failure of governance that is independent of the substantive content of these laws. I would probably dislike many of the 12 appropriations bills that would be passed by this Congress, but I still think America would be better off if they had gotten at least some of their work done on time.
I expect that, between now and Thursday midnight, the House and Senate will pass and the President will sign into law a continuing resolution, commonly referred to by insiders as a CR.
A continuing resolution (CR) is a law that provides temporary funding for those parts of the federal government for which annual appropriations laws have not yet been enacted.
Even more simply, a continuing resolution is a temporary short-term spending truce.
The defining attributes of a CR are:
- It funds only those parts of government that have not already been funded by an appropriations law. This year that’s all 12 bills – pretty much the whole federal government.
- It is temporary and usually short-term. CRs typically fund the government only for a few days, weeks, or a couple of months. It is rare but not unheard of to do a full-year CR. Often Congress will pass several short-term CRs in succession, to repeatedly buy themselves just a little more time to get the appropriations bills done.
- It is a continuation of the previous year’s funding levels (+ or – a small delta) and policies. Congress in effect agrees to a short-term truce in which they merely extend what was done last year for a little while, to buy themselves time to battle out the new funding priorities that they should have gotten done by now.
Since the first attribute is well-known in any given year, policymakers will talk about a CR in terms of duration and funding levels. “We’re going to do a one week CR at last year’s levels,” or “I heard there will be a CR at least year’s level + inflation that will get us into the lame duck session.”
Sometimes the parties will fight about the level and duration of the CR or whether a particular spending change should be included. In my experience the legislative leverage almost always lies with (a) whichever person or party wants the shorter duration CR and (b) whichever person or party wants a “clean” CR, meaning fewer or no policy or funding changes.
Other times there’s a truce in which the party leaders agree not to make a big deal about the terms of the CR. This year there’s a big red vs. blue battle on taxes, so that may suck some of the air out of a potential CR battle. You may therefore see little press coverage of the CR, because no conflict ==> no news.
I expect a CR that will extend past Election Day and expire sometime in November or December. After the election everyone will regroup in Washington, figure out what the election results mean for the balance of power, and then decide whether they want to try to broker appropriations compromises in the lame duck session or extend the CR into the new year when (maybe) a new party takes control of Congress.
I don’t have good intel on what funding level this year’s first CR will provide. The bid/ask spread is usually between last year’s level and last year’s level + an adjustment for inflation. It’s designed to be somewhat tight to encourage Congress to actually get their regular appropriations work done.
While a CR is supposed to be a simple extension of last year’s funding allocations and policies, there are always a few handfuls of anomalies justified by particular conditions. For instance, it doesn’t make sense to continue the Census funding at the 2010 levels into 2011, because we’re not redoing the Census next year. The appropriators and OMB will usually negotiate this list of anomalies, in which everyone agrees that only technical corrections like this one are allowed. Policy changes that one or another party wants are excluded.
The Obama Administration recently submitted a list of proposed changes that go well beyond technical anomalies. From a process standpoint the appropriators should ignore the proposed policy changes and accept only the technical anomalies. The right place for the policy debates is in the regular appropriations process, whenever that should occur. If the Administration’s proposed changes were sufficiently important then they should have pushed on Congress to get their work done sooner.
In 1995 Republicans included a Medicare premium policy change in a Continuing Resolution. The change was generally considered technically necessary and should have been noncontroversial, but it was nevertheless a policy change. President Clinton seized the opportunity to make a political issue out of the Medicare premium “increase.” He vetoed that CR. The government shut down and President Clinton successfully assigned blame for the shutdown to the Republican Congress. While a few Republican Members are thumping their chest that they welcome a government shutdown, there are enough Republican Members and staff in positions of power who remember that shellacking that they won’t allow Republicans to make the same mistake again. A CR will be enacted into law in the next few days.
(photo credit: maistora)
A confusing blue team strategy
We are now deep in the season of red vs. blue team politics and election strategy. I had hoped to join the tax extension policy fray but last Thursday Senate Majority Leader Reid announced that he would not bring a bill to the Senate floor until after the election, killing the issue for the next six weeks. Even if the House votes on a bill soon, that will be just for show. The real action will happen after the election, although we don’t know precisely when. I will therefore save my policy comments for later and instead describe my confusion about this season’s blue team political strategy and how it interacts with economic policy.
I usually analyze and try to describe how policy gets made, subject to political and election constraints. This close to an election, politics dominates everything, so I’ll look at partisan election strategies and how policy influences it.
Please don’t assume the following analysis means that I think the substance of the issue is unimportant. On the contrary, I assume that policymakers on both sides of this debate feel passionately about their substantive views in this battle, and that they are thinking strategically so they can achieve their desired policy outcome and maximize their team’s chances in the upcoming election. The teams’ strategies serve these two goals.
While I didn’t anticipate it, after the fact I understood the President/Speaker/Majority Leader’s decision to press forward on health care despite overwhelming public opposition. I think blue team leaders decided the policy victory was worth risking some Democratic seats in the midterm election. While I argued against and still strongly oppose the resulting laws, at the same time I respect their willingness to risk their Congressional majorities for a long-term policy goal.
Here are several more recent strategic actions from the blue team leaders that confuse me.
Choosing to fight about taxes
In 1996 President Clinton and Congressional Democrats had a policy theme for the election: “Medicare, Medicaid, education and the environment.” They repeated those same six words, in that order, thousands of times. As a young member of the opposing red team it was infuriating because it worked. Democrats looked for every opportunity to set up votes to draw bright partisan contrasts on those four subjects. They didn’t say what they wanted to do for Medicare, Medicaid, education and the environment. They were instead signaling, “These four things are important to Democrats. If they are important to you, vote for Democrats.” They were smart to choose four policy areas that align center-left. The natural political coalitions on each of the first three involve spending more government money, and that excludes the right. The usual policy solution associated with the environment is more regulation, which again mostly excludes the right. By picking partisan fights on those policy areas in an election year, President Clinton made sure his team had home field advantage in the election-policy debate.
In American politics taxes are traditionally a center-right coalition. Tax fights tend to unify Republicans and split Democrats. Elected Republicans like arguing about taxes because they instinctively feel they are on “their turf,” much as elected Democrats correctly feel they have the natural political advantage arguing about Medicare, Medicaid, education and the environment.
Of course both sides have arguments they can make on the other team’s turf. Democrats play class warfare or attack unpopular industries (tobacco, Big Oil, health plans, Wall Street, multinational firms) when fighting about taxes. When fighting about education, Republicans push policies that split poor inner-city families from teachers’ unions. Sometimes you can fight almost to a draw on the other team’s turf.
But from an election standpoint, why bother? Of course the economy is front-and-center, but economy does not equal taxes. Why not pick election-year fights on topics that play to your party’s natural alliances and political advantage? A tax fight in this election season was inevitable – we knew this nine years ago when, forced by the Byrd rule, we (red team) set the sunset date at December 31st, 2010 during Senate consideration of the 2001 Bush tax cut bill. While the substantive fight during Fall 2010 was therefore inevitable, the blue team leaders could have downplayed it. They could have signaled several months ago that taxes would be dealt with in a lame duck session after the election. Republicans would have tried to pick a pre-election fight on the issue but would have once again been mostly ignored by the press. And since the majority party controls the floor, Republicans would have had little opportunity to elevate the fight. Democrats could have easily replied, “We said we’ll deal with that later.”
In my experience, Republicans like to debate taxes more than almost anything else, especially before an election. I don’t understand why the President chose to elevate a tax fight to the #1 issue in this electoral cycle. If the 2010 elections are about economics, wouldn’t the blue team instead have been advantaged by a sustained fight over education spending or a partisan split over “Wall Street fat cats vs. real Americans?”
Choosing a specific policy argument where the other side probably wins the center
In the tax extension debate the blue team’s bumper sticker says “Republicans want to help their rich friends and blow out the deficit.” The red team’s says “Don’t raise taxes in a weak economy.” Class warfare may rally the Democratic base but in the center it’s awfully hard to beat “Don’t raise taxes in a weak economy.” The red team has this time won the center with their arguments. The blue team should have anticipated this. I know my insider friends on the red team did, and they couldn’t figure out why the blue team leaders chose to elevate this specific tax fight when the economy is so weak. Why didn’t they quietly agree to a one or two-year extension and have this fight when the economy is stronger?
Teeing up a big fight, watching your team split, continuing the fight, then folding
The sequence of events was:
- The President picks a big fight on the tax extension and highlights the partisan split;
- a handful of Senate Democrats signal they’re not onboard; (first warning)
- the Speaker says “the Senate will go first;” (second warning)
- the President doubles down on the fight and elevates the conflict by making it the centerpiece of his election-cycle argument;
- the President’s just-resigned budget director guts the President’s argument in his first New York Times column; (third warning)
- (same day as #5) the President proposes “new” policies that are ignored by both sides; (confusion reigns)
- Members return from August recess;
- 30 House Democrats bail on the President’s position; (final blow)
- Senate Democrats delay the vote until after the election.
That’s not poor coordination, it’s a total absence of coordination. Going into a highly partisan conflict on the other team’s turf, you either make sure your team is unified first, or when you figure out they’re not, you concede or switch topics quickly. We have seen a strategy and an alliance slowly collapse over a several month period. I don’t understand how the blue team leaders could allow that to happen.
Trying to make the small business lending bill bigger than it is
This one I sort of understand. The President and his allies are losing the small business argument as the red team pounds away about impending tax increases on successful small business owners. Blue team leaders and their allies therefore took a small bill that Republicans opposed and tried to make it a big deal. It’s not a bad move as long as the substantive claim is at least somewhat convincing. But the small business lending bill is tiny and will have a trivially small economic impact. It didn’t take long for the press to figure this out, helped by the small business lobby (NFIB) and Congressional Republicans. I see why the President’s team tried to do this, but I wonder if internally anyone said, “Uh, guys, this isn’t a credible argument.” Because it wasn’t from the start. They should have known it would at best be a weak counter to the Republican small business arguments. Maybe they played the only card they had, knowing it was weak.
Attacking Republicans for not having a policy agenda that differed from that of President Bush
I understand the political logic of this if it’s a one-move game. Congressional Republicans don’t call these the “Bush tax cuts,” and their lack of a positive policy agenda made them vulnerable to the blue team attack “We Democrats want to go forward to a successful future, they want to return to the failed past.”
But political battle includes reacting to the other team’s moves and anticipating your opponents’ reactions. Now that House Republicans have released a policy agenda of their own, both components of this attack are invalid. Never mind what’s in the plan – the “no plan but Bush’s” attack is now ineffective. Didn’t the blue team leaders anticipate this Republican response after Leader Boehner telegraphed it repeatedly over the past two months? If they did, where’s their counter-move now that Republicans have rebuffed their initial attack with a perfectly predictable move? It’s like playing checkers with a child before he learns double jumps.
Proposing a new stimulus-but-it’s-not and having it fizzle in the same week
Two months before Election Day, when the economy swamps all other issues, the President proposes three “new” economic policies and everyone in both parties ignores them. That’s embarrassing. Republicans don’t even bother attacking these policies because the President’s purported allies in the Congressional majority ignore the “new” ideas. What was the strategic purpose of proposing $50 B more infrastructure spending, immediate business expensing, and a recycled R&D tax credit proposal in early September? Was this an attempt to put Republicans on the defensive? To give Democrats something they could be for while they opposed preventing tax increases on small businesses? Was it an attempt to move toward Republicans and propose something they might accept, anticipating a House Republican majority? To shape press coverage in September? It failed at each one of these goals. Whatever the President’s goals with his early-September proposals, we can safely conclude that his goal was not to be ignored. On a smaller note, in his press conference the President seemed surprised by the question “Is this another stimulus?” He should have been ready for that one.
I’ll conclude by summarizing the main lines of blue team attack and where they stand today:
- “Republicans hate small business and are blocking this good lending bill.” – The President signed the bill into law, nullifying this attack.
- “Republicans want to give tax cuts to their rich friends and blow out the deficit.” – The bill was delayed until after the election by Democrats, some of whom sided with Republicans. Republicans’ response is “Don’t raise taxes in a weak economy.”
- “Republicans have no policy agenda except Bush’s.” – This was nullified by the new House Republican Pledge to America.
Several external forces are working to tilt the election day playing field from blue to red. At the same time, the moves made by each team’s leaders in the weeks leading up to Election Day can matter a lot. Either I’m missing something big or the blue team’s leaders are making repeated unforced errors.
(photo credit: Bruce Turner)
Should you be the next Larry Summers?
You can read this post here or at Fortune.com / CNN Money.
A close advisor to President Obama calls you. “Larry Summers will soon leave his job as Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the White House National Economic Council,” this person says. “I’m calling to see if you have any interest in serving the President in that capacity. If you do, I’ll set up a meeting for you with the President.”
You are savvy enough to know that saying yes to the meeting means you’re committed to taking the job if offered. If you don’t want the job you need to say so before the offer is made.
You have heard frequently that Larry Summers has been the President’s top economic advisor, but you don’t really know anything about the job. Here are five things you should know about the job of White House NEC Director.
1. The President and his team need an economic policy coordinator. In that role you will be expected to be an honest broker.
Dr. Summers heads of one of three White House policy councils. Each council is comprised of Cabinet members and senior White House advisors. Every policy issue that comes to the attention of the President “belongs” to a policy council. Your counterparts will be General Jim Jones at the National Security Council and Melody Barnes at the Domestic Policy Council. Your primary day-to-day job will be to coordinate for the President the economic policy process for every issue in your domain. Within the Administration you will be the official source of the answer “What is the President’s policy on X?” where X is any economic policy issue.
You and your team of about 20 expert staff will identify questions that need a Presidential decision. You’ll get the President the information and advice he needs to make a decision, and you’ll make sure a decision gets made when it’s needed. You’ll communicate the President’s decision to the rest of the President’s team within the White House and the Cabinet, and you’ll coordinate the implementation of that decision to make sure the enormous and unwieldy Executive Branch does what The Boss wants.
You will chair hundreds of economic meetings and run the economic policy process. You will have the pen on the memos and slides the President sees. You will chair/moderate meetings the President has with his economic team. You will be leading a team of 10-20 powerful and strong-willed Presidential advisors, each of whom is convinced that he or she knows what the President should do on this issue. Some of them will have independent channels in to the President. If these advisors think you are using your process control to shut out their views, they can and will undermine your process. That’s bad for the President and makes your job much more difficult.
The way to address this is to build the trust of the President’s advisors that you can and will be an honest broker. This means letting a Cabinet Secretary directly advise the President even when you strongly disagree with his recommendation. You have an obligation to make sure the President gets accurate information, but a good honest broker places paramount importance on the President getting a wide range of advice from different perspectives.
This economic policy coordination role is an inside job. You will be the hub of economic policymaking within the Obama Administration, but you will often rely on others to interact with the outside world. Sure you’ll do some press from the White House lawn and you may even give an occasional big speech. At times you’ll negotiate with Congress, but you will not always be the President’s lead negotiator. You will have your hands more than full running dozens of meetings and conference calls each week. You will make sure the economic Cabinet members and White House staff are all pulling in the same direction, and get decisions from the President when his advisors are divided.
2. The President may also want a key/primary economic advisor.
As an honest broker you are not expected to be devoid of opinion. If the President wants you this close to him he will need to respect you and trust your advice. You will have physical and bureaucratic proximity to the President, and if you’re good at your job he will seek your advice on a wide range of issues. That Presidential respect and trust does not, however, automatically come with the NEC chair. Dr. Summers has it. You will have to earn it.
3. It’s not just stimulus, taxes, and financial reform.
The White House policy council heads have more policy breadth than almost anyone else in government. Your portfolio will include the macroeconomy, the stimulus and tax debates, trade and international investment, and the implementation of the new financial reform law. But you will also run meetings on farm policy and telecom issues, on GSE reform and infrastructure spending, on the underfunded defined benefit pension system and how to lower gas prices when they spike (good luck on that one). You can delegate some of these to your able deputies, but you will spend hundreds of hours wrestling with impossible choices on issues that are both important and low profile. You will be surprised at how many policy decisions get made by the President, and it will be your job to manage many of them.
4. White House staff jobs are not naturally high-public profile positions.
Dr. Summers has garnered far more public attention as NEC Chair than anyone since Bob Rubin, and far more than his counterparts General Jones and Ms. Barnes. The President may want you to be an important economic spokesperson for him, but he also has a press secretary and communications director, a visible Vice President, several economic Cabinet members, and a Council of Economic Advisers chairman who does a lot of press. You’ll do press from the White House lawn, but don’t assume you will be as visible as Dr. Summers has been. If you want to be on TV all the time, ask for a Cabinet job instead. If you want to testify before Congress do the same. White House policy council heads are not Senate-confirmed and don’t testify.
5. While Cabinet Secretaries are the princes of their domains, you’re just staff.
Every morning each Cabinet Secretary arrives at their fiefdom chauffeured in a government car. Each day they are the most important person in their building.
You will drive yourself to work and begin each day at the White House senior staff meeting in a room of two dozen colleagues who are your bureaucratic equals. You will know that you are all trumped by the President, sitting just ten yards away from you in “the Oval.” While you will chair hundreds of meetings and conference calls and coordinate the President’s economic team, the upward-facing component of your job will remind you every day that you are just staff. Your job will not be to run an agency, not to manage a staff of thousands, and not to jet around the world as a diplomat. Your job will be to help the President do his job on your issues. You need to be comfortable in a staff role, because if you take this job it will become your life.
One final thing. Tell your family you love them and will miss them greatly. You won’t see much of them for the next couple of years, and when you’re with them you’ll be on your Blackberry every three minutes.
(Photo credit: Wikimedia)
Roles of the President’s White House economic advisors (updated)
(This is a minor update of a post I wrote six weeks ago when Dr. Christina Romer’s departure was announced. I have updated this version to reflect the recent announcement of Dr. Larry Summers’ departure at the end of this year.)
The President’s Budget Director Peter Orszag left the Administration in late July. Dr. Christina Romer, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, returned to California a few weeks ago. Now Dr. Larry Summers, Assistant to the President and Director of the National Economic Council, has announced that he will leave the Obama Administration near the end of this year.
This means that three of the four top economic slots in the Obama Administration will turn over by the end of 2010.
We know that Jack Lew is the President’s nominee to replace Dr. Orszag at OMB, and I hope the Senate soon confirms him. The President recently promoted CEA member Austan Goolsbee to Chairman. Of the core four only Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner remains.
I think I can add a little value by describing the different positions that make up the President’s economic team, and in particular by explaining the roles of the heads of the National Economic Council and the Council of Economic Advisers. Dr. Summers will run the NEC for a few more months, while Dr. Romer was and Dr. Goolsbee now is the CEA Chair.
White House staff
Let’s begin with some formal organization that is broader than just the economic team. Within the Executive Branch there is a bureaucratic structure called the White House Office (WHO) and another called the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The White House Office is a subset of the EOP. Most of the names you know and the people you see on TV and in the press labeled as “White House staff” work in the White House Office:
- Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and his two Deputy Chiefs of Staff Jim Messina and Mona Sutphen;
- Senior Advisors David Axelrod, Valerie Jarrett, and Peter Rouse;
- Communications Director Dan Pfeiffer and Press Secretary Robert Gibbs;
- White House counsel Bob Bauer;
- head of Legislative Affairs, Phil Schiliro;
- Staff Secretary Lisa Brown;
- heads of the three White House policy councils:
- National Security Council (Jim Jones);
- National Economic Council (Larry Summers);
- Domestic Policy Council (Melody Barnes);
- and a handful of others.
Each of these senior White House staffers reports to the President, and each has a title in the form of Assistant to the President for X. Rahm Emanuel is Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff. Phil Schiliro is Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs. Larry Summers is Assistant to the President and Director, National Economic Council.
Each Assistant to the President (AP) has a staff of 1-4 Deputies, up to about eight Specials, and also junior staff. The Deputies are formally Deputy Assistants to the President, and the Specials are Special Assistants to the President. Technically, each reports “to the President,” but each does so through their respective AP.
Each AP has an office in the West Wing of the White House where the Oval Office is located. Generally, proximity to the President correlates with power.
Now let’s move outside the bureaucratic structure of the White House Office. The Executive Office of the President (EOP) includes the White House Office. It also includes two large organizations, the Office of Management and Budget and the US Trade Representative, and several smaller ones, including the statutorily created Council of Economic Advisers, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The OMB Director and CEA Chair have offices in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building with many other White House staff, and are informally considered “White House staff.” Importantly, these two attend the daily White House senior staff meetings, which thus makes them a part of the President’s core team just like the head of legislative affairs, the senior advisors, the communications director and press secretary, and the heads of the policy councils. If you want to get formal and technical, the OMB Director and CEA Chair are “EOP staff,” not “White House staff,” but in the real world there is no practical difference, and you should think of them as White House advisors to the President.
The USTR is across the street and has a little more distance from the President and the core team. Also, he or she is often jetting around the world, so the USTR often plays in his or her trade sandbox and is slightly removed from other, non-trade, issues.
The President’s economic team
The formal roles of the economic team members remain roughly constant from one Administration to the next, but the informal roles depend on the President, his management style, and the people on his team.
- Director of the National Economic Council (NEC) – Now held by Dr. Larry Summers. The NEC Director’s job is to coordinate economic policy for the President.
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy – This is now Mona Sutphen. The DCOS’ involvement in economic policy is, I think, very particular to any given White House. In the Bush 43 White House, the DCOS was heavily involved in all policy areas, including economic policy. This person is not only close attuned to the needs of the President and the Chief of Staff, but he or she has “visibility” into other policy areas as well and a better view of the macro policy picture than some members of the economic team. While the DCOS may be less of an economic specialist than most other members of the economic team, he or she is usually “wicked smart.” The DCOS and NEC Director are White House staff and therefore are not Senate-confirmed. Every other position listed below is subject to Senate confirmation.
- Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) – Until about September 1, this was Dr. Christina Romer. It is now Dr. Austan Goolsbee. The CEA Chair is generally the chief economist in the White House and almost always comes from an academic background.
- Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) – Dr. Peter Orszag had this job until last July. Jack Lew is the President’s nominee to replace Dr. Orszag. A Member of the Cabinet, the OMB Director develops, implements, and manages the budget for the President. He or she also is the senior management officer within the executive branch, supervising the regulatory process and other management oversight. Imagine trying to manage implementation of a $2 trillion budget.
- Secretary of the Treasury – Tim Geithner has this role. The Secretary of the Treasury is generally considered the President’s chief economic spokesman and often is considered the President’s senior economic advisor. The reality depends on the specific issues and the people involved. The Secretary of the Treasury is the primary face of the Administration on the economy and economic policy, and is usually a major power player within the Administration on economic policy, if not the principal player below the President. Formally his turf is narrower than most foreign finance ministers, who usually exercise OMB’s budget function as well. But his policy domain includes taxes and debt management, domestic and international finance, going after terrorist financing, and the U.S. dollar; he often plays a role in many other areas as well. The Secretary of the Treasury is usually particularly highly visible in international economic policy and interactions with financial markets and institutions.
- Secretary of Commerce – This is now held by Gary Locke. Generally considered the next most important economic Cabinet position, Commerce is sometime thought of as the “industry and trade” slot. During the financial crisis, President Bush had Secretary of Treasury Hank Paulson working on financial institutions and markets, and he had Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez as his lead negotiator on auto industry issues. That’s a traditional sectoral division of labor. Less well known is that Commerce also handles things like technology and telecommunications policy, meteorology (through NOAA, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration), and the Census, along with a bunch of other stuff.
- U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) – Now held by Ron Kirk. USTR is the President�s lead trade negotiator.
- The Secretaries of Labor, Energy, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and the head of the Environmental Protection Agency each handle sectors of the economy with significant economic impact.
White House policy councils
The policy councils are organizational structures centered in the White House that the President uses to help him make policy decisions. The National Security Council was the original policy council, formed by President Truman in 1947. Presidents Johnson and Nixon had domestic policy staffs, which turned into the Office of Policy Development in the White House. President Clinton formalized the creation of a separate National Economic Council and a Domestic Policy Council, making three policy council staffs. President Bush (43) created a fourth, the Homeland Security Council, which has since been folded back into the National Security Council.
Each council is chaired by the President and consists of Cabinet members and, in some cases, White House staff. Everyone listed below on the economic team is a member of the National Economic Council, and there’s an NEC staff of maybe 20ish professionals headed by Larry Summers. While formally the term National Economic Council refers to the set of principals (Cabinet officials and Assistants to the President) who comprise the council, colloquially the term NEC usually refers to the head of the Council (Larry Summers) and his or her staff.
The policy councils divide up all of policy – every policy issue “belongs” to a policy council. Any disputes about which council owns an issue are resolved by the Chief of Staff. The respective policy council staff coordinate that policy issue for the President. The word coordinate is carefully chosen – it does not mean “run” or “decide” or “implement.”
I used to describe it to new NEC staff like this:
A big part of our job is to be the official and definitive source within the Administration for the answer to the question, “What is the President’s policy on X?” where X is anything have to do with economic policy. That can be simple, like “What is the President’s policy on extending the capital gains tax rate?” Or it can be far more complex, like “What is the President’s policy on Senator Grassley’s amendment to tighten the three-entity rule in calculating income limits on certain farm subsidy payments?”
Part of our job is to know and explain the answer to every one of those policy questions, but it’s not our job to decide the President’s policy. Our job is instead to:
- figure out which policy questions need a Presidential decision;
- get him the information he needs to make a decision, and make sure it is accurate, complete, useful, and well-presented;
- make sure he has maximum flexibility and as wide a range of options as possible, and that he understands the merits of the various options;
- make sure he gets recommendations from his advisors, especially when they disagree; and
- make sure we get a decision from him in a timely fashion.
Once we get a decision, it is our job to work with the rest of the President’s team in the White House and the Cabinet to make sure that decision is faithfully implemented and accurately and convincingly communicated. Others take the lead on those tasks, while we help them understand the President’s policy so they can do their jobs well.
NEC, CEA, and the policy process
It’s easy to confuse the very different roles of the NEC and the CEA.
The NEC Director (Summers) runs the economic policy process. It’s a process management role. When an economic policy issue needs a Presidential decision, the Director of the NEC manages the process within the White House and the Executive Branch that ultimately results in a Presidential decision. Policy council staff run many meetings and conference calls.
The NEC Director generally has an advisor role and an honest broker role. The advisor role is the high visibility one that everyone thinks is fun: you get to tell the President what you think he should do on every economic policy decision he needs to make.
The honest broker role consumes much of the NEC Director’s time. Each week the NEC Director and his or her staff of about twenty run dozens of meetings and conference calls of senior Administration officials to discuss and debate policy questions, gather recommendations, and ultimately advise the President. In my view, the best NEC Directors were the ones who would not impose their own policy views on this decision-making process, but instead would let the 5-20 other senior advisors to the President slug it out. The NEC Director would make sure the debates were informed by accurate information, solid policy and legal analysis, and rigorous logic and strategy. If a Cabinet Secretary or a senior White House staffer thinks that the NEC Director is going to prevent the President from hearing his or her advice, or that the NEC Director has his thumb on the decision-making scale, then that Cabinet official or White House staffer will often seek a back channel to bypass the decision-making process and provide unfiltered ex parte input to the President. The President has to deal with so many issues and so many decisions that if this NEC-led process breaks down, the wheels eventually come off.
In addition to whatever personal skills and abilities he or she brings to the job, most of the NEC Director’s power comes from his or her proximity to the President (physically, bureaucratically, and sometimes personally), from the breadth of his turf, which covers all economic policy, and most importantly from the reality that he or she runs the meetings and controls the paper. If the NEC Chair is effective and perceived as fair by other members of the President’s economic team, he also gains power from other senior advisors who want to help the NEC policy process succeed, even when they sometimes disagree with the President’s decisions.
The CEA Chair (Goolsbee) is the leader of a team of three Members of the Council of Economic Advisers. One CEA chair described CEA’s role as an internal economics consulting shop within the White House. The CEA Members all have economics PhDs and always come from an academic background, as do most of their senior staff economists. The senior staff economists generally take a one year leave of absence from their academic positions at universities. Junior staff economists are often non-tenured young academics or newly-minted PhDs. Some of the staff economists are detailed from other government agencies.
The CEA chair and staff manage all the economic data statistics for the President and prepare memos for him which explain the data. They analyze the economics of policy options, help design those options, and help critique other options. They spend a lot of time explaining economics and educating the President, other members of the economic team, other Presidential advisors, and the public about the basic economic facts and logic that underlie every policy question.
Therefore NEC does economic policy and decision-making, and CEA does economics. They’re different. CEA staff apply economic theories and data to economic policy, while NEC staff operate at the intersection of economics, policy design, the law, communications, politics, strategy, and the practical aspects and constraints of legislating and managing a bureaucracy.
Simple example: Should the President support a $1 gas tax increase?
This is not just an economic issue. There are effects on energy policy, on environmental policy, on transportation policy, and on the budget. There are legal issues, tax policy and administration issues, and effects on State and local governments. There are political constraints, vote-counting limitations, and interest group pressures and counterpressures. There are communications and electoral effects. For this supposedly simple yes/no question, let’s look at everyone within the Executive Branch who has a legitimate claim to providing advice to the President.
- NEC would host the meetings.
- CEA would attend and explain the economics of a gas tax increase – what would happen to fuel consumption, how would supply and demand shift, what would be the effect on driving and on oil imports. CEA would often tap into other expert economists inside and outside government for this information and analysis.
- Treasury would attend because it’s a tax issue. They would be the lead in expressing views on the tax policy, design, and administration issues, as well as on the broader economic effects.
- OMB would attend and be happy that the deficit would be lower. In an R Administration, OMB would sometimes oppose this policy because of the tax increase. But then somebody (probably Transportation or EPA) would argue we should spend the money and OMB would push back hard. OMB would also explain how gas taxes interact with the Highway Trust Fund.
- Commerce would attend because of the broad economic impact across a range of industries.
- Transportation would attend because it involves, duh, transportation.
- EPA would attend and be excited that emissions would be lower. They would also snipe with Transportation over who had jurisdiction.
- Energy would attend because it’s an energy issue, even though the Department of Energy really doesn’t do fuel taxes or vehicles.
- Interior might want in because they do oil and gas production.
- Agriculture would want to be included because of the significant effects on farmers, both for their farm equipment and the cost of shipping their goods.
- Since this is principally a domestic economic issue, you probably don’t need State or USTR there.
In the Bush Administration, we would also include the Chief of Staff or someone from his office, White House Counsel (always good to have a lawyer in the room), White House legislative affairs (to tell us where the votes were, which Member would scream loudest, whether we had a chance of enacting it, and if so, how best to do it); White House political affairs (usually to discuss expected support and opposition from outside interest, far more than the raw politics of the issue), White House Communications and the Press Secretary, and someone from the VP’s staff. For a gas tax increase we’d also include the head of the White House Council on Environmental Quality.
If you have two from NEC (running the meeting) and the Chief’s office, and only one from each other shop (don’t forget the other senior White House Advisors listed above), that’s at least 18 people in the room. At least. Each has a legitimate claim to be there, and each has a view on whether the President should support a $1 gas tax increase.
I would guess that in the Obama White House they would also include Carol Browner, who has a new role as an Assistant to the President for Energy & Environment Issues (one of the new czars), as well as Valerie Jarrett, who among other things handles State and local issues for the President. If the Feds raise gas taxes, that makes it harder for the States to do the same.
On a straightforward question like a gas tax increase for which the substantive analysis is easy, there would probably be three meetings: one of mid-level White House and Agency staff chaired by the NEC Deputy or the NEC Special who handles energy issues, a principals meeting of Cabinet-level officials and senior White House advisors chaired by the NEC Director, and then a meeting with the President. I’d guess that maybe 200-300 man-hours (of very senior people) would precede a 45-minute decision meeting with the President.
Can it be a smaller meeting? Absolutely, and sometimes it is. You can always have fewer people involved, but at a minimum it’s important that the President understand all the dimensions of the decision. Of course, if you cut people out, especially from access to the President, it’s harder to get them to play as part of the President’s team.
NEC’s primary role (Summers) is to manage this circus for issues within his broad scope, keep it moving forward, and make sure the result of that process is useful to the President. CEA’s primary role (Romer) is to participate in that process as the lead economist.
I hope this explanation shows why CEA is almost always run by an academic PhD economist, and NEC is often run by someone without an academic economics background but instead with a policy or management background. Dr. Laura Tyson, Dr. Larry Lindsey, and Dr. Larry Summers are all PhD economists who ran the NEC. Bob Rubin, Gene Sperling, Steve Friedman, Al Hubbard and I were not PhDs or academic economists.
It can be particularly tricky when the head of NEC is a brilliant and well-regarded economist in his or her own right. Why should the President look to the CEA Chair for the formal economics, when he already has a brilliant economist as his NEC Director? Why does he even need the CEA Chair in the room? At the same time, are academic economic training and credentials the right skill set to manage a policy process, be an honest broker, and balance the economics with all the other factors that go into a Presidential decision?
I can see at least three obvious structural differences between the way the Obama economic team operates and the way we did during the Bush 43 tenure:
- President Obama meets with a few of his principal economic advisors daily. Gut reaction: this is both a blessing and a curse. President Bush met with different configurations of his advisors as needed, rather than with the same group each morning. During normal times this averaged 2-3 meetings with the President per week. During the financial crisis it was almost every day, and sometimes more than once on a busy day.
- The proliferation of White House czars means that economic policy processes and decision-making are more dispersed in the Obama White House. As best I can tell, NEC did not run the health policy process for President Obama in 2009-2010, nor the cap-and-trade policy process, as it did during the Bush era. You can decide whether that’s good or bad.
- The current NEC Director has previously served as Treasury Secretary and is a leading academic economist in his own right and would be extremely well qualified to chair the CEA. This makes him at least a potential threat to both Secretary Geithner and the CEA Chair, and it means that everyone needs to work extra hard to make sure their roles are understood and that they can function together as a team.
I hope this contributes to a better understanding of both the roles the President’s White House economic advisors play and how the Presidential policymaking process works.
President Obama vs. the Christie Principle of Shared Sacrifice
President Obama and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie are providing a phenomenal case study of the intersection between economics and political argument.
The President and Governor each make their case about how much government should spend on salaries of teachers and other government employees in a recession. The debate is fascinating because the traditional arguments are inverted. The Democrat is arguing growth, while the Republican is arguing equity.
First here’s the President on Monday in Fairfax, Virginia:
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Now, the challenge we have is, ironically, that if you start laying off a whole bunch of teachers, or a whole bunch of police officers or firefighters, now they don’t have a job, which means they spend less, which means that there’s less tax revenue. And you start getting into a vicious, downward spiral.
Now, here’s Governor Christie, speaking at a Town Hall meeting last week:
GOVERNOR CHRISTIE: Ask the people in the private sector in the state of New Jersey, when the last time was they got a raise. Yet the average teacher contracts, before I became Governor, had 4.9 percent annual increases, when we had zero or one percent inflation. Now that can’t be justified any longer.
I’ll label this the Christie Principle of Shared Sacrifice: At all times, and especially during a difficult economy, it is unfair for those who run government, and those who receive paychecks from government, to exempt themselves from the difficult financial decisions that other private citizens are required to make.
Usually Republicans argue growth/efficiency, and Democrats argue equity. It is surprising and refreshing to hear a Republican effectively make this case.
Gov. Christie uses another equity argument to explain why New Jersey teachers should be required to contribute toward the cost of their health insurance:
The federal government for federal employees pays 66 percent of the cost of the health benefits for their employees. The state of New York pays 83 percent of the health costs for their employees. In the state of New Jersey, overall for all employees across the board, we pay 92 percent of the costs of the health insurance for every one of our public employees. And, among teachers, the overwhelming majority of teachers in the state of New Jersey, pay nothing towards their health insurance premiums, for full family medical, dental, and vision coverage, and, for benefits that do not just continue during employment, but if they stay employed long enough, for benefits that continue for life.
President Obama is arguing growth to justify more government spending, and Governor Christie is arguing equity to justify less. The political debate about economic policy has inverted.
You can see Governor Christie’s entire answer here:
Retracting one of my CBO health care posts
I have received pushback from a couple of sources on a post I wrote a few weeks ago, titled “CBO gives us the complete picture five months late.” In that post I said CBO failed to provide lawmakers with clear information about the gross spending and revenue effects of the health care laws as they were being debated, instead providing information only on the net deficit effect. I also ascribed ill intent, saying that CBO “buried” this information.
When writing that post, I had missed table 2 in this March 20th letter from CBO to Speaker Pelosi. That letter clearly separates spending from revenues, and easily allows the reader to distinguish both the gross and net effects of the bill. A commenter was helpful to point out that I had missed it.
Other presentations of the legislation still concern me, and I remain frustrated that the core presentations combine spending increases and tax cuts into “deficit effects.” I understand the arguments for this presentation, and in some contexts it makes sense. I accept the argument (made to me more than once) that the formats provided were those being requested by Members and staff on both sides of the Hill.
My underlying substantive point remains: I am concerned that Members, staff, and outsiders in both parties focus solely on deficit effects, to the exclusion of thinking first about the gross spending and revenue effects of legislation. We should care about the size of government (as measured by spending), and also about how we finance any given level of government (the balance between taxes and deficits). When we focus only on the deficit effect of legislation, we blur these two separable questions and confuse the discussion.
This is a problem throughout Washington, and, to their credit, the covers of CBO’s annual budget reports show a graph with separate spending and revenue lines. I will continue to argue for analysis and prominent presentation of the effects of legislation on both the size of government and the budget deficits that flow from financing it.
At the same time, my post of August 25th was incorrect. I was sloppy in missing table 2 in the March 20th letter. Also, I now think I went too far in ascribing (guessing, really) the intent behind the result. I guessed that CBO was probably pressured by Congress, and probably concealed information as a result of that pressure. I should not have inferred that without stronger backup.
It’s important that I admit when I was wrong, especially when I labeled CBO as having “failed” and ascribed ill intent. I’m falling way back to, “They made a judgment call that I wish they had made differently.”
I retract the “CBO failure” argument which was in fact incorrect, regret going so far as to ascribe ill intent when I couldn’t prove it, and feel stupid for having missed table 2 in the March 20th letter to the Speaker.
I’ll bonk CBO hard when they screw up, as I have done to OMB on occasion. This time, they didn’t. I did.
My bad.
(photo credit: Josh Gurian)
“I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you!”
Nine years ago today President Bush visited Ground Zero in New York City. One lasting image is of the President, standing on a pile of rubble with his hand on the shoulder of a firefighter named Bob Beckwith, talking to the rescue workers with a bullhorn.
Over the weekend I realized I know most of the people who were with the President at that moment.
Eric Draper was the President’s chief White House photographer for all eight years. He led an incredible team of photographers who captured key moments in the Presidency. Eric is a phenomenal photographer, a good man, and I am proud to have worked with him.
I’d like to share Eric’s photo and comments from Eric and others who were on the scene when it was taken.
(Updated with an addition by Karl Rove)
You can click on the photo for a higher resolution version.
From left to right:
- (partial white shirt) unnamed NYPD;
- (black helmet, in back) unnamed rescue worker;
- (white helmet on head and in hands) Assistant NYFD Chief ?
- (light blue helmet) Al Concordia, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Presidential Protection Division, US Secret Service;
- President Bush;
- retired firefighter Bob Beckwith;
- (blue coat) Carl Truscott, Special Agent in Charge, Presidential Protection Division, US Secret Service; and
- Governor George Pataki.
(I would greatly appreciate help in identifying those whose names I don’t know.)
I describe Administration officials below with the job titles they had at the time.
Eric Draper, White House Photographer:
I remember standing at the site which still smoldered from the terrorist attack three days earlier. President Bush had just finished touring Ground Zero and embracing and talking with hundreds of firefighters. As the White House Photographer, I focused on capturing the strong emotion there. I had to press my way through the crowd to stay with the President, who was being guided to a spot to speak. I was close enough to the President to touch his legs if I tried, so I had to use my widest camera lens. When he said, “I can hear you,” I knew it was going to be a powerful, historic moment. I watched my President lead the country through its shock and grief.
Eric reports that the photo was taken with a Nikon N90 camera, 17-35 zoom lens on Fujichrome 400 film. Shutter speed 500/2.8.
(My plug for Eric: Eric now runs his own photography business and I highly recommend him.)
Joe Hagin, Deputy Chief of Staff:
Most don’t realize it but he is actually standing on a crushed fire engine – the highest part of what was a huge fire pumper, reduced to about four or five feet high. The firefighter standing with him was actually a retired member of the department who grabbed his old helmet and headed to Ground Zero when he saw what had happened on TV.
Bob Beckwith, the firefighter standing with the President (in a Time magazine story five years ago):
I got home and I told my wife, ‘I’m going down,’ ” he said, referring to the smoldering remains of the Twin Towers.
At first, his family dissuaded him from going to Ground Zero, but after Beckwith discovered that one of his colleague’s sons was one of the hundreds of firefighters missing, he put on his old uniform, strapped on his helmet and went to join the rescue efforts.
Beckwith had to finagle his way into Ground Zero when he approached the heavily guarded perimeter.
“I said, ‘Come on, guys. You know I got to get in there.’ I showed them my identification card from the fire department and so a couple of guys let me through,” Beckwith said.
Once inside the perimeter, Beckwith got a firsthand look at the charred remains of the World Trade Center and immediately began working to find survivors.
…
“And the president came and he is shaking hands with all the ironworkers and all the cops and all the firemen that were down there … and I figure he’s going over to the microphones, but he makes a quick right, and he puts his arm up and I said, ‘Oh my God!’ ”
After helping the president onto the truck, Beckwith begins to crawl down, but Bush stops him.
“He says, ‘Where are you going?’ I said, ‘Uh, I was told to get down.’ He said, ‘No, no, you stay right here.’ ”
“Do you remember the TIME magazine where the president is holding up the flag? He wanted me to have that flag. I still have it,” Beckwith told CNN.
Logan Walters, personal aide to the President:
Driving to the event there was a real emotional tension, we all knew we were going to a place of epic tragedy in our Nation’s history but the reason for our visit was to provide strength and support to those who were there, and the Americans who would be watching on television. Not a lot of conversation, and because the event had little planning there was little to discuss on the way. We knew there would be unscripted moments that would be seen around the world. The wreckage on the site was terrible, there were several places where smoke was still rising from the ruins of the towers. Beams, wires, concrete and other skeletal remains were visible among the ash. Although many families and friends were still hopeful of finding loved ones, it was apparent upon seeing what was left of the towers that it would take no less than God’s hand to pull a survivor from what was left there. It was a heartbreaking sight. None of us at the White House had slept much since the attack, but we had showered and grabbed a meal or two and some rest. It seemed like no one at Ground Zero had stopped working since they were allowed into the site, and by talking to the people in charge we learned that was generally true. People were literally working to total exhaustion, multiple days without any real rest or food, and were still pushing themselves. No one wanted to give up. We talked to numerous emergency responders as the President walked the site. Most looked exhausted, had ash on their clothes and faces, and were emotionally drained. As the President talked to them, expressing gratitude, consoling some, and encouraging all, you could feel the strength and energy rising. He stepped up on the ruins of the fire engine, was handed the bullhorn, and began to speak. From the other side of Ground Zero, where a large number of the emergency responders had gathered, someone yelled “We can’t hear you!” The President’s response was from his heart, totally unscripted, and everyone felt he power of his words. The site literally erupted with cheers, it was incredible and energized and lifted those working at Ground Zero and those of us traveling with the President. In the end, all of us, I think the President included, left with a renewed energy and strength. Those men and women inspired all of us to work hard and do all that we could to support the President as he worked to protect our Nation. What we came to provide to them, they actually gave to us.
Karen Hughes, Counselor to the President:
I traveled to New York with President Bush on September 14, and will never forget the raw emotions, the incredible sadness, yet, in the end, the enduring inspiration of that day. Although I had seen the images on television, nothing could have prepared me for the moment when our motorcade turned the corner and we saw the still smoldering pile of twisted steel at Ground Zero — it was so horrifying that my hands instinctively covered my face. The rescue workers had been working non-stop for three days. They were exhausted, angry, full of emotion — and they wanted to hear from their President. We had not planned for him to speak, as earlier that day he had delivered a moving address at a national prayer service at the National Cathedral in Washington. But we realized that the rescue workers at Ground Zero needed to hear from their President, and our terrific advance staffer, Nina Bishop, went to find a bullhorn. She had the President climb up on a ruined fire truck so people could see him and he kept fire fighter Bob Beckwith up with him — the crowd was shouting they couldn’t hear him — and when he turned and said, “I hear you, the rest of the world hears you, and the people who knocked down these buildings are going to hear from all of us soon,” it summed up the determination of our nation. The President’s remarks were a response to the rescue workers — totally unscripted, perfect for the situation, and standing there, I knew immediately this was an historic moment. I turned to my friend, Joe Allbaugh, the director of FEMA who had been Governor Bush’s chief of staff in Texas, and said, “That’s the person we know, and that’s going to be in his presidential library someday.” It was a day of incredible emotion and sadness — there was literally a hole in the heart of Manhattan — yet in the end, it became a day of inspiration as our motorcade left the city and thousands of New Yorkers lined the streets shouting “Thank you” to the volunteers and “God Bless America!”
Greg Jenkins, advance team:
I was shepherding the pool that day, having arrived with a small team from DC the night before, and was standing next to Draper when he took the photo. Nina Bishop — another advance person — was the one who is responsible for the bullhorn. As the President was shaking hands with first responders it became increasingly clear that he had to say something. Thinking fast, Nina found a bullhorn and when the President stood atop the rubble she simply handed it up to him and he did the rest. Completely unplanned. Totally authentic moment. But the untold story is how the video came to be.
When people recall the television imagery of the President making those remarks atop the rubble, what they don’t know is how that happened. Twice.
The press pool consisted of some print reporters, some still photographers, and one television crew (correspondent, producer and cameraman). Since we were in the middle of Ground Zero, the television camera wasn’t connected to an uplink truck, therefore it was not live. What we didn’t know was that another network some blocks away had a camera on top of a building pointed at Ground Zero. From their vantage point, and as far as they could zoom in, all they could make out was a small cluster of people at Ground Zero (that was us). The producer in our press pool was on his cell phone giving live color commentary to all the networks who were in the pool. The networks also had access to the live shot from the other network from the building some blocks away. When the producer said that the President was about to make some remarks, he held up his phone to get the President’s voice. The networks put the voice of the President broadcast from a cell phone over the live video from the other network, and voila!
The closeup video that we recall of the President’s remarks atop the rubble was actually broadcast later in the day when the pool cameraman was able to feed his closeup video.
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Karl Rove, Senior Advisor to the President, from his book Courage and Consequence (reprinted with permission):
We tumbled out of the vehicles into an ocean of noise. The president’s arrival set the crowd off. Standing on rescue equipment and piles of debris, these huge and powerful ironworkers, steelworkers, and rescue personnel were screaming “U.S.A! U.S.A!” The president made his way around a horseshoe of chanting workers to shake hands and thank them. …
Bush was hearing and seeing the rescue workers up close. They were not shy about sharing their feelings. These men were working on adrenaline and passion and, after three days and increasingly less frequent good news about survivors, they were nearly spent. Pataki was right; the presidential visit was energizing for many of the people we met. …
I watched this from a short distance off. Behind me a few yards to the east were about twenty religious leaders, led by Cardinal Edward Egan. They too had joined in the chanting, many waving small American flags. Most were weeping. I could not glance at them for more than an instant: I felt I too would succumb if I looked too closely or too long at them.
There was a tug on my sleeve. It was Nina Bishop, a White House advance woman working the event. She pointed to the chanting workers and said, “They want to hear from their president.” No one had prepared remarks, but she was exactly right. …
… I asked her if there was a microphone available. She shook her head no. Could she get a bullhorn? She scurried of to grab one from some of the workers milling around. I looked for a place the president could speak from. The SUVs in the motorcade had wide running boards, but if he stood one one, he would still not be seen by all the people who had clambered up on piles of rubble and vehicles all around us.
Right next to me was a giant wrecked fire truck. The pumper had been smashed by falling debris. Its crumpled door read 76 ENGINE COMPANY. Its tires had blown out, and its body was crushed, but three men were standing on top o fit and the entire crowd could see the president if he joined them. I looked up at the workers, and as I did one jumped off the truck. I got the attention of the remaining two and asked them if it was safe. The younger of the two replied it was, while the older man, wearing a fireman’s hat from New York Fire Department Company 154, nodded in agreement. I was unconvinced, so I asked them to jump up and down. They looked quizzically at the strange guy in a suit and tie, and I repeated my request. They hesitatedly jumped up and down; the truck looked steady enough for Bush to clamber up. I told the two men, “Stay there — someone might need your help to get up.” Before going to look for Andy, I reached for a piece of paving block that had jiggled when the rescue workers jumped up and down. A policeman grabbed my wrist and stopped me, saying there might be a body part underneath. I felt sick.
I found Andy Card and shared Nina’s suggestion; he immediate agreed that it was a good idea and asked where the president could speak. I pointed at the battered fire truck. Andy made a beeline to the president. Nina had commandeered a bullhorn from a man who worked for Con Ed and met me at the fire truck with it. The bullhorn’s batteries weren’t that good, but it was all we had. Nina gave it to Logan Walters. As she turned away, I grabbed a small American flag sticking out of Nina’s courier bag and handed it up to the thin, older rescue worker who was now the last man standing on the truck. His companion had disappeared off the back of the pumper and out of history.
The president took the bullhorn and reached his hand up to the rescue worker, a retired sixty-nine-year-old New York firefighter named Bob Beckwith. Beckwith looked down into the scrum below him, saw the outstretched hand, grasped, and pulled. In an instant, Bush was sharing the top of the truck with Beckwith, who suddenly realized he’d helped up the president of the United States. Beckwith tried to crawl down but the president asked, “Where are you going?” Bob said he was getting down. Bush said, “No, no, you stay right here.”
The cheers and chanting subsided and the president started to speak into the bullhorn. With the National Cathedral prayer service still fresh on his mind, Bush began by saying, “I want you all to know that America today is on bended knee in prayer for the people whose lives were lost here, for the workers who work here, for the families who mourn. This nation stands with the good people of New York City and New Jersey and Connecticut as we mourn the loss of thousands of our citizens.” Someone yelled, “Go get ’em, George!” Someone else yelled, “George, we can’t hear you!” and others echoed this complaint. Bush paused and then responded in a voice now fully magnified by the bullhorn, “I can hear you.” The crowd went nuts–and he knew what to do from there. “The rest of the world hears you,” he went on, “and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.” The crowd broke into defiant, even bitter, chants of “U.S.A.! U.S.A.!” Bush handed the bullhorn off and he climbed down.
In an iconic moment, George W. Bush was very much alone with an enormous responsibility. The nation wanted reassurance; it wanted to know it had a leader who understood the mission America now faced. No speechwriters, no aides, no advisors were involved in Bush’s response. It was an authentic moment that connected with the public in a strong, deep way. Without assistance and in an instant, George W. Bush gave voice to America’s desires.
Seeing President Bush hop up on that busted truck and stand shoulder to shoulder with a weary firefighter is a sight forever etched in my mind, and for many it remains one of the most inspiring scenes from the terrible events of 9/11. Presidential historian Douglas Brinkley’s assessment of Bush’s visit to Ground Zero was prophetic: “We can’t judge him as President Bush anymore, but we’re soon to be judging him as commander in chief.”
I’d love to add to this post the recollections of any first responders on the scene when the President spoke, or any of those in the press pool mentioned by Greg.
Thanks once again to President George W. Bush for his leadership during this time of national tragedy and crisis.
And thank you to all those who worked so tirelessly at Ground Zero nine years ago.