The Senate HELP Committee staff has filed an official copy of their draft legislation with the Senate clerk. A friend and I were discussing today two possible tactical scenarios:
- The weekend leak forced the majority staff to release their official text as damage control. Under this scenario, filing the official copy is a damage mitigation strategy: “If there’s going to be a version out there, let’s at least have it be a version we want.”
- The weekend leak was by the majority staff, and filing the official text is part of a gradual rollout strategy.
I’m guessing scenario 1 is right. Either way, we now have official text to chew on. This text is more expansive than the leaked version I posted Monday. It contains some new items, but is largely identical to the leaked draft.
More importantly, I have now had more time to read the 615 page bill. (I skimmed some parts.) Doing so turned up some things I missed the first time. So here are ten more things you should know about the official draft of the Kennedy-Dodd health care bill.
(Editorial note: I have made a page that will always have the latest version of this complete list, along with the comparison to the House Democrats’ bill. I will also post when I update that page.)
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[Policy under discussion].
A few inside friends confirmed my guess – they think this is a tactical move by the majority staff to try to relieve blowback from the employer groups: Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, NFIB (the small business lobby), etc. Until it is otherwise demonstrated, I will continue to assume that the Chairman’s mark will include language that will roughly parallel that in the leaked draft.The bill gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to limit premiums and profits of health plans by forcing plans to rebate to enrollees premiums above a certain margin.
Specifically, section 2704(a) is the “Requirement to provide value for premium payments.” A health plan must report how much of their premium revenues are used for clinical services, how much for “activities that improve health care quality,” and how much for “all other non-claims costs.”Section 2704(b)(1) then tells the Secretary to look at how much other health plans spent on “all other non-claims costs,” and based on that survey, set an allowable percentage for this category. Plans are then required to rebate premiums if they go above this amount. This is direct (but confusing) regulation of premiums and profit margins.I found the labeling of this section interesting. It appears that this section will be the justification for the claim that this bill reduces health care costs. Loosely phrased, it appears their argument will be “We’re reducing health care costs by forcing plans to lower their administrative costs and profits.”
The bill mandates that health plans include and provide financial incentives for the “medical home model” for services, then gives a highly prescriptive description of this model, detailing the interactions among the health plan and different types of providers.
Section 3101(m) requires qualified health plans to develop and adopt a strategy “that provides increased reimbursement or other incentives for … improving health outcomes … including through the use of the medical home model defined in section 212 [of the] Affordable Health Choices Act, for treatment or services under the plan or coverage;”Section 212 then sets up the “medical home model” over seven pages of legislative text. I am far from an expert in plan-provider relationships, and am not familiar with the medical home model. But the language looks highly prescriptive, as if it is defining an extensive set of rules about the interactions among plans and different types of providers. I would love help from some commenters on what’s going on here, or some more education about the “medical home model.” My instinct is that, even if it is a good delivery model, the federal government should not be tilting the playing field for or against it.
The bill requires health plans adopt Medicare and SCHIP�s �generally implemented incentive policy to promote high quality health care.
Employers must offer the same health insurance to all employees, independent of salary.
Gateways can charge a tax of up to 3% of premiums to cover implementation and administrative costs.This is a huge deal. Take a typical $13,000 (employer-based) family health insurance policy. That means the State can add up to $390/year to the cost.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall required that Gateways shall “ensure that [uninsured] individuals are directed to enroll in the program [that she deems] most appropriate.” This is in the context of whether they should enroll in a private health plan, or a government plan: Medicaid, SCHIP, or the new “public option.” The bill gives SecHHS authority to push/force State Gateways to push/encourage/force? the uninsured toward (or away from) particular types of plans. The danger is that a SecHHS could say, “It’s best to have all the uninsured in a government plan.”
States (through Gateways) shall redistribute premiums from plans with low-risk individuals to those with high-risk individuals.
This gives the people running Gateways a tremendous amount of power over health plans.
States can opt out their state and local employee plans for the first four years. I’m trying to think of a reason why they should be treated differently. Otherwise, it looks like caving to pressure either from State governments, or from public employee unions.
The bill creates a new $10 B “Reinsurance for Retirees” fund to subsidize costs for those between ages 55 and 64. The bill defines eligible “employers” to include “a voluntary employee benefit association.” This may include the UAW VEBA.
This looks like a fallback. Traditionally, health advocates on the Left have wanted to allow near-retirees (55-64) to “buy in early” to Medicare. And I need to be clear – I cannot conclude that this provision was written specifically to benefit the UAW VEBA. I just know that it allows a VEBA to apply as an employer for a share of this fund, and that the UAW VEBA is the most prominent one that might ask for such funds.
A few inside friends confirmed my guess – they think this is a tactical move by the majority staff to try to relieve blowback from the employer groups: Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, NFIB (the small business lobby), etc. Until it is otherwise demonstrated, I will continue to assume that the Chairman’s mark will include language that will roughly parallel that in the leaked draft.
Specifically, section 2704(a) is the “Requirement to provide value for premium payments.” A health plan must report how much of their premium revenues are used for clinical services, how much for “activities that improve health care quality,” and how much for “all other non-claims costs.”Section 2704(b)(1) then tells the Secretary to look at how much other health plans spent on “all other non-claims costs,” and based on that survey, set an allowable percentage for this category. Plans are then required to rebate premiums if they go above this amount. This is direct (but confusing) regulation of premiums and profit margins.I found the labeling of this section interesting. It appears that this section will be the justification for the claim that this bill reduces health care costs. Loosely phrased, it appears their argument will be “We’re reducing health care costs by forcing plans to lower their administrative costs and profits.”
Section 3101(m) requires qualified health plans to develop and adopt a strategy “that provides increased reimbursement or other incentives for … improving health outcomes … including through the use of the medical home model defined in section 212 [of the] Affordable Health Choices Act, for treatment or services under the plan or coverage;”Section 212 then sets up the “medical home model” over seven pages of legislative text. I am far from an expert in plan-provider relationships, and am not familiar with the medical home model. But the language looks highly prescriptive, as if it is defining an extensive set of rules about the interactions among plans and different types of providers. I would love help from some commenters on what’s going on here, or some more education about the “medical home model.” My instinct is that, even if it is a good delivery model, the federal government should not be tilting the playing field for or against it.
This gives the people running Gateways a tremendous amount of power over health plans.
This looks like a fallback. Traditionally, health advocates on the Left have wanted to allow near-retirees (55-64) to “buy in early” to Medicare. And I need to be clear – I cannot conclude that this provision was written specifically to benefit the UAW VEBA. I just know that it allows a VEBA to apply as an employer for a share of this fund, and that the UAW VEBA is the most prominent one that might ask for such funds.
Remember, you can now always find an updated version of the complete list here.
While the list of two dozen items surely creates an impression of why I oppose this bill, I would like to put some structure on it. I hope to post in the next few days a higher-level view that crystallizes my biggest concerns with this bill in a structure that is easier to understand.
(photo credit: Wikipedia)
