Blog2017-06-03T09:45:07-07:00

Dr. Goolsbee gets it wrong on the auto loans

This morning on Fox News Sunday, host Chris Wallace moderated a discussion about the auto industry. One of his guests was Dr. Austan Goolsbee, who is a Member of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers and chief economist on the President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board.

I want to focus on some incorrect and inflammatory statements by Dr. Goolsbee this morning:

Chris Wallace: I also want you to talk about the clash between policy and profits. The governments wants General Motors to make small cars, fuel-efficient cars, while all the indications are, that according to the market, the cars they make most profit on are SUVs and pickup trucks. So which takes preference? Profits for the taxpayer shareholders, or environmental policy?

Dr. Goolsbee: The President made totally clear in his remarks, and he specifically said we are not going to be in the business of telling General Motors or anybody else what kind of cars to make, where they should open their plants, or anything of the sort. The President made clear we want to get out of this as quickly as possible. We are only in this situation because somebody else kicked the can down the road, and that’s really an understatement. They shook up the can, they opened the can, and handed to us in our laps.Senator Shelby knows that to be true. When George Bush put money in to General Motors, almost explicitly with the purpose, how many dollars do they need to stay alive until January 20th, 2009? There was no commitment to restructuring, to making these viable enterprises of any kind. They made none of the serious sacrifices. And Republicans in the Senate attached a list of conditions, they opposed George Bush’s intervention, because they said the unions had not made the following sacrifices. In the Obama plan, it asked more and received more from the unions and from the other stakeholders than the people that objected to the bailout last November asked for. So we have finally put them on that path.

This is incorrect. I will bite my lip, refrain from commenting on the tone, and focus on the facts.

History

At 3:30 pm on Sunday, November 30, 2008, a quiet meeting occurred at the Treasury Department in Secretary Hank Paulson’s office. Present for the Bush Administration were Treasury Secretary Paulson and Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, Deputy COS Joel Kaplan, White House Legislative Affairs chief Dan Meyer, Treasury Legislative Affairs head Kevin Fromer, and me. Present for the incoming Obama Administration were Deputy COS-designate Mona Sutphen, NEC-designate Dr. Larry Summers, Dan Turullo (now a Fed Governor), and WH Legislative Affairs-designate Phil Schiliro. We had requested the meeting. They agreed and asked that it be held outside the White House. It appeared to us that they were quite concerned about leaks, and about the risk of creating a public impression that they were working closely with us.

At that meeting, we (the Bush team) floated a proposal to establish an auto czar. President Bush would create a new position called a Financial Viability Advisor (FVA) through an executive order. The President would instruct the FVA, for any auto manufacturer that sought a “bridge loan,” to evaluate that firm’s restructuring plan for viability. If after 60 days (which the FVA could unilaterally extend for another 30) the firm did not have a plan to achieve viability, then the FVA would produce his own plan to make that firm viable. The draft executive order was explicit that the FVA could include a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in his plan. We invited the Obama team to suggest names for the Financial Viability Advisor, so that it would be someone with whom the new President would be comfortable.

Under the Bush team’s proposal to the Obama team, the current Secretary of the Treasury (Paulson) would provide bridge funding from the TARP, and he would state that, as a matter of policy, no further TARP funding would be made available except in support of (1) a plan certified as viable by the FVA, or (2) the FVA’s own plan.

The key to success of this plan was that the Obama team would publicly link arms with us and agree that they would continue the Paulson policy statement when they took over after January 20th. Thus, the auto company’s stakeholders would know that they had no wiggle room, and that they had no chance of getting additional funding from the next Administration. The Obama team would voluntarily commit itself to be bound by the restriction self-imposed by the Bush team.

Remember that this was one of two huge issues going on at the time. The bigger issue was the financial crisis, and we were nearing the limit on the $350 B of available TARP funds. We were concerned that another too-big-to-fail institution might fail before January 20th without Treasury having the funds available to prevent a systemic collapse. So our proposal to the Obama team was a package deal: we will announce the above process for autos, and we will ask Congress for the second $350 B of TARP funding, if the President-elect publicly supports us on both. They would join with us in convincing Congress to approve the last tranche of TARP funding, since we would need help with Congressional Democrats.

We saw two huge economic issues that posed grave risks to the economy and to a smooth transition. We proposed to work together with the incoming Administration in a way that we thought minimized these risks and would have positioned the new President as well as possible on January 20th. GM and Chrysler would not be in liquidation, and there would be a strict, tight, and enforceable deadline (of about March 1) and process for GM and Chrysler to become viable or to have time to prepare for an orderly Chapter 11 process. We would have a cushion in case another major financial institution failed in the last eight weeks, and the next President would not have to be bothered with having to ask Congress for the last $350 B from the TARP.

The Obama team were polite and professional. They listened carefully and gave little reaction in the meeting. We concluded based on their questions in that meeting that they were leaning against the proposal, because they did not want to be bound by the judgment of a Financial Viability Advisor – they wanted the ability to make decisions in the White House. They also appeared to want to avoid being bound by our strict definition of viability. (We defined a viable firm as one that would, under reasonable assumptions, have a positive net present value without additional taxpayer assistance.)

Dr. Goolsbee was not in this meeting. I do not know if he was aware of it, either back in November or this morning.

Despite multiple efforts to get the Obama team on board, they did not take up our proposal, nor did they suggest any modifications. At the end of that week we gave up on that approach and began to negotiate a bill with Speaker Pelosi, Chairman Barney Frank, and Chairman Chris Dodd that would provide bridge loans from previously appropriated non-TARP funds.Senate Republicans blocked that bill. Congress adjourned for the year and went home. In the last week of December, GM and Chrysler told us they would file under Chapter 11 in early January if they did not get loans from the TARP. They also told us, as did countless outside experts, that they were not ready for such a filing, and that Chapter 11 would lead to near-immediate liquidation. We estimated that about 1.1 million jobs would be lost if this happened.

Confronted with a choice between loaning TARP funds to GM and Chrysler, and allowing both to liquidate in the weeks before his successor took office, President Bush authorized loans from the TARP to GM and Chrysler. We had warned Senate Republicans earlier that month that the President would face this choice if legislation failed. This was (and still is) a politically unpopular decision, and was the least worst of two bad options. Based both on his public comments and what I saw privately, President Bush wanted to give the firms a limited amount of time and a hard back end to prepare for and, if necessary, to force an orderly Chapter 11 process. He also knew that President-elect Obama would be facing tremendous challenges in his first days in office.Despite their different political parties and policy perspectives, President Bush stressed that we needed to provide his successor with the time and space he would need in the opening weeks of his Presidency.

Structure of the December loans to GM and Chrysler

In the last few days of December, Treasury loaned $24.9 B from TARP to GM, Chrysler, and their financing companies.

According to the terms of the loan (see pages 5-6 of the GM term sheet), by February 17th GM and Chrysler would have to submit restructuring plans to the President’s designee (and they did).

Each plan had to “achieve and sustain the long-term viability, international competitiveness and energy efficiency of the Company and its subsidiaries.” Each plan also had to “include specific actions intended” to achieve five goals. These goals came from the legislation we negotiated with Frank, Pelosi, and Dodd:

  1. repay the loan and any other government financing;
  2. comply with fuel efficiency and emissions requirements and commence domestic manufacturing of advanced technology vehicles;
  3. achieve a positive net present value, using reasonable assumptions and taking into account all existing and projected future costs, including repayment of the Loan Amount and any other financing extended by the Government;
  4. rationalize costs, capitalization, and capacity with respect to the manufacturing workforce, suppliers and dealerships; and
  5. have a product mix and cost structure that is competitive in the U.S.

The Bush-era loans also set non-binding targets for the companies. There was no penalty if the companies developing plans missed these targets, but if they did, they had to explain why they thought they could still be viable. We took the targets from Senator Corker’s floor amendment earlier in the month:

  1. reduce your outstanding unsecured public debt by at least 2/3 through conversion into equity;
  2. reduce total compensation paid to U.S. workers so that by 12/31/09 the average per hour per person amount is competitive with workers in the transplant factories;
  3. eliminate the jobs bank;
  4. develop work rules that are competitive with the transplants by 12/31/09; and
  5. convert at least half of GM’s obliged payments to the VEBA to equity.

If, by March 31, the firm did not have a viability plan approved by the President’s designee, then the loan would be automatically called. Presumably the firm would then run out of cash within a few weeks and would enter a Chapter 11 process. We gave the President’s designee the authority to extend this process for 30 days.

In another error this morning, Dr. Goolsbee claimed the “Obama plan, it asked more and received more from the unions and from the other stakeholders than the people that objected to the bailout last November asked for.” As I wrote last Monday (Understanding the GM bankruptcy), I have seen no convincing evidence that GM workers will now be paid competitive compensation with transplant workers, nor that the work rules are competitive with the transplants. The negotiations led by the Obama team did meet the Corker targets for the unsecured debt holders and the retiree benefits, but current workers still look to have received a relatively good deal.

Chronology

November 30: Bush team proposes joint solution to Obama team.

The following week: Obama team declines to respond. Bush team begins negotiations with House and Senate Democrats.

Mid-December: Bush team negotiates compromise legislation with House and Senate Democrats. Senate Republicans block the legislation. Congress goes home.

Late December: President Bush authorizes the above-described three month loans to GM and Chrysler.

January 20: President Obama takes office.

Mid-February: GM and Chrysler submit their first viability plans, per the terms of the Bush-era loans.

End of March: President Obama says GM and Chrysler have failed to develop viable plans, as required by the Bush-era loans. He gives Chrysler 30 more days, and GM about 60 until the end of May.

End of April: Chrysler files Chapter 11 with a pre-packaged plan negotiated largely by the Obama Administration.

June 1: GM does the same. Chrysler emerges from Chapter 11.

Responding to Dr. Goolsbee

Let’s again examine Dr. Goolsbee’s claim:

We are only in this situation because somebody else kicked the can down the road, and that’s really an understatement. They shook up the can, they opened the can, and handed to us in our laps. Senator Shelby knows that to be true. When George Bush put money in to General Motors, almost explicitly with the purpose, how many dollars do they need to stay alive until January 20th, 2009? There was no commitment to restructuring, to making these viable enterprises of any kind. They made none of the serious sacrifices.

Even if Dr. Goolsbee was not privy to the quiet discussion we had with the senior Obama team last November, the public record refutes his claim:

  1. The Obama team declined to respond to the Bush team’s offer to work together to create a joint process that would have resulted in a resolution by March 1st or April 1st, rather than by June 1st for Chrysler and maybe September 1st for GM.
  2. We then worked with the Democratic majority to enact legislation that would have limited funds to be available only to firms that would become viable.
  3. After Congress left town for the holidays without having addressed the issue, President Bush was faced with a choice between providing loans and allowing these firms to liquidate in early January, which would have further exacerbated the economic situation for the incoming President. President Bush chose to provide the loans.
  4. We provided GM and Chrysler with sufficient funds to get to March 31st, not January 20th, and in those loans we gave the incoming Administration the ability to extend them for 30 more days.
  5. The loans were conditioned on restructuring to become viable, with a precise definition of viability, specific restructuring goals, and quantitative targets.
  6. The Obama Administration followed the restructuring process laid out in the Bush-era loans. They are now measuring that deal against the targets established in the Bush-era loans. The only changes the Obama team made were that they extended GM for 60 days rather than 30, and the Obama Administration directly inserted themselves into the negotiations as the pre-packager.

Dr. Goolsbee’s comments this morning were both inflammatory and incorrect.

Sunday, 7 June 2009|

Working in the West Wing: Doing a TV news interview on the North Lawn

This is the second in a series of occasional posts about the nitty gritty of working in the West Wing of the White House. I am describing things as they were in the Bush Administration. YMMV in the Obama Administration. Again, it seems a bit silly to write about such trivial details, but given the positive feedback on the first post in this series, here goes.

I did my first TV interview at the beginning of 2008 shortly after being promoted. At first it was stressful, and it took me a while to get used to it. Now that I’m on the outside, I do an occasional interview on CNBC, Fox, or CNN. Today I’d like to describe the mechanics of doing a TV news interview from the North Lawn of the White House. Even though I had worked in the White House for more than five years before my first on-camera interview, I did not know any of this until I actually had to do it.

Today is Jobs Day: the first Friday of the month, when the Labor Department releases the monthly employment report. The employment report is generally the most important economic data point of the month, and the business news channels (CNBC, Bloomberg, and Fox Business) always cover it. They always ask for someone from the Administration to comment on the data and what it means for the economy and the policy agenda. I see the Vice President’s economic advisor, Jared Bernstein, is doing CNBC now. In 2008, CEA Chairman Dr. Ed Lazear and I typically did this duty.

The jobs report is released at 8:30 AM on Friday. As with all economic data releases, Administration officials are embargoed from talking about it publicly for one hour after the release. This gives the markets time to process the data without the Administration’s viewpoint.

For each show broadcasting at 9:30 AM, a network producer negotiates with a staffer in the White House press shop. For us it was Eryn Witcher, a top-notch professional with prior experience in TV news who now works as the communications director at Stanford’s Hoover Institute. Eryn would negotiate with the producers and set Ed and/or me up with interviews.

Ed and I would talk the night before about the upcoming data and what we might say about it on the air. We were among a handful of officials who got the data reports before they were released, so that we could advise the President. Ed and his staff also used that data to prepare the daily “economic data memos” that the President received each morning.

We would generally watch the CNBC commentary immediately after the data release (at 8:30 AM sharp) to see if we had missed anything, and to take a temperature check on the initial market reaction and expert analysis. We would generally be prepped by Ed’s chief of staff, Pierce Scranton, who had an uncanny ability to predict what questions we would be asked, and coached us on how to give a short effective answer. If he wasn’t fighting other fires, Deputy Press Secretary Tony Fratto would also sit in the prep session.

A little after 9 AM someone would do my makeup in my office. Around 9:15 Eryn and I (or Eryn and Ed) would walk out to the North Lawn. You need a good TV tie (no busy patterns), straight collar (I was often scolded for button down collars), and American flag pin. After a while I got my own earpiece that I would bring out with me, so I wouldn’t have to use the common one that everyone else uses. It’s also nice to know you won’t lose the earpiece during the interview.

Each network has a TV camera set up in an area on the North Lawn next to the driveway from Pennsylvania Avenue to the West Wing entrance. The networks semi-permanently set up shop there in 1998 during the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the gravel-filled area became known as Pebble Beach. It was refurbished during the Bush Administration with slate and the cameras and tripods are covered with heavy green canvas when they’re not being used. It is now referred to as Stonehenge, to which it bears a vague resemblance.

The cameras are in a long line next to each other. Each is set up so that the person on air has the north entrance to the White House residence in the background. Because of the different camera positions, each has a slightly different angle on the White House. On the night of a big Presidential speech from the White House, try quickly switching channels and you can see the different angles.

Here’s a diagram for CNBC (roughly). As always, you can click on the picture for a larger view.

north_lawn_stonehenge

The West Wing is the square building in the lower-left (southwest) corner. The residence is in the lower-right corner, and that’s Pennsylvania Avenue up top.

The blue box surrounds Stonehenge with all the TV cameras. When you’re on CNBC you stand at the red dot, facing the camera at the orange dot. The yellow line shows the camera angle, extended to capture the north entrance to the Residence in the background.

If you look closely, to the right (east) of the blue box you can see the driveway that heads south from the Northwest Appointment Gate to the West Wing entrance. Visitors with appointments in the West Wing walk up this driveway, and you can occasionally see them passing behind someone being interviewed on TV (especially on the evening news broadcasts). If they’re walking from left to right on your screen, they’re arriving at the West Wing. Right to left, they’re leaving.

About 9:15 AM Eryn and I would walk out to Stonehenge. We would greet the cameraman and a producer, and I’d get miked up. All the producers I met were friendly and professional, and the cameraman are universally great. I would stand at the red dot facing the camera. My earpiece cord would clip to the back of my jacket collar. The cameraman would connect an audio cable to that cord, and there’s a small box at about waist high with a volume dial. He attaches a tiny microphone to my lapel and I’m all set.

The cameraman then adjusts the camera for the shot. I’m generally looking at myself on a monitor below the camera: tie is straight, flag pin is upright. (Left and right are reversed from what you’re used to in a mirror. That takes getting used to.)Around 9:25, I’ll hear audio of the show in my earpiece, and then a voice:

Voice 1: Mr. Hennessey, this is

[Bob] at CNBC headquarters. Can you hear me?

Me: Yes I can, Bob.

Voice 1: And you can hear the program?

Me: Yes.

Voice 1: Great. Can you count to ten for me, please, so we can do an audio check?

Me: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,…

Voice 1: That’s perfect. Thank you.

After another minute, another voice, the producer for my segment of the show.

Voice 2: Mr. Hennessey, this is [Tom]. We’re going to a commercial break, and will be going to you in about 2 minutes. You’ll be interviewed by [Erin / Mark / Erin & Mark].

Me: Sounds great. Thank you.

During my first few interviews, the substance wasn’t that difficult for me. I had been prepping principals for interviews and writing talking points for more than 13 years, now I just had to do the talking. The hard parts were the nerves and the physical mechanics:

  • Look at the camera lens. Don’t let your eyes wander.
  • Smile.
  • Try not to “um” and “you know” too much.
  • Slow down.
  • Relax.

Also, TV moves very quickly. Long answers don’t work, so I had to train myself to make my point in one or two sentences, rather than four or five. (That’s difficult for me.) If you go on too long, you’ll start hearing the anchor trying to jump in and move things along. And before you know it, you’re done.

After the interview, you unmike, thank the cameraman and producer, and you’re done. If you have another interview, you move down the line and repeat. If not, head inside, take off the makeup, and get feedback from your colleagues and friends who email that they saw you on TV.

I only did a few in-studio interviews, and guest hosted CNBC’s Squawk Box once. I was blown away by the ability of the anchors to multitask, and how quickly they think and react. While one of them is talking on camera, another is checking market news or data on their screen, or scanning email. Their producers are talking to them in their earpieces, and they are talking on camera with each other and the guests. The coordination, reaction times, ability to adapt and improvise, and teamwork among the anchors and their producers are amazing. Beginning that day, and ever since I have developed tremendous respect for those business news anchors hosting live fast-moving discussions. I have enough trouble doing a single five minute segment, and they do it for 2-3 hours five days a week.

Friday, 5 June 2009|

Today’s jobs report

On the first Friday of each month the Labor Department releases the employment report for the prior month. In the White House we used to call it Jobs Day, and it’s a fairly big deal when the economy is in transition.

Today is Jobs Day. Here are the two most important facts from the May employment report:

  • The U.S. economy lost a net 345,000 jobs in May. This bad news beat expectations, so markets reacted positively.
  • The unemployment rate jumped from 8.9% to 9.4%, the highest since August 1983.

In an effort to build traffic, I am going to start posting occasionally on other blogs and websites. So you can read today’s post on the Jobs Day report on National Review Online’s The Corner. I hope you don’t mind the extra click.

Continue reading “Today’s jobs report” on The Corner…

Friday, 5 June 2009|

Will the stimulus come too late?

I began this blog at the end of March after the stimulus bill had become law. I had been struck by how much the stimulus debate had focused on whether the bill was efficient. (It clearly was not.) There was much less discussion of whether the stimulus would be effective, and of the timing of the macroeconomic boost.

Everyone wants to know when the U.S. economy will start growing. I will focus on a related question: when will the stimulus law begin to have a significant positive effect on U.S. economic growth? And could it have come sooner if the Administration had done something different?

I believe the Administration made an enormous mistake in its legislative implementation of the stimulus. As a result, the boost to GDP will come six to nine months later than it needed to (maybe more). Given the President’s desire to do a large fiscal stimulus, and given his policy preferences, he could have had a different bill that would have been producing significant GDP growth beginning now, rather than in the middle of next year. That’s a huge mistake with real consequences for the U.S. and global economies.

To illustrate this point, let me classify four types of fiscal stimulus:

  1. a permanent tax cut;
  2. a temporary tax cut;
  3. one-time checks to people independent of their tax liabilities; and
  4. increased government spending through federal and state bureaucracies: infrastructure, energy spending, etc.

There is of course a fifth option: no fiscal stimulus law.

If you’re going to do a fiscal stimulus (big if), the best kind is a permanent tax cut. It is effective, efficient, and fast:

  • effective – People spend a large proportion of a permanent tax cut. This is derived from Milton Friedman’s “permanent income hypothesis.”
  • efficient – People spend their own money on themselves, so they waste very little of it, and they spend it on things that matter to them. Again, see Milton Friedman.
  • fast – Checks are delivered quickly, and people spend most of their own money soon after they get the check.

This was part of the short-term logic behind the 2003 tax cut, which we designed to foster both short-term and long-term economic growth. I also have a strong general policy preference for lower taxes rather than more government spending, but that’s a separable question from how it works as short-term stimulus.

In 2008 we knew we could not get a Democratic Congress to enact a permanent tax cut. Q: Do you then go for a temporary tax cut, or do nothing? The President thought the risks of an economic slowdown in 2008 were significant enough that it made sense to pursue a (second best) temporary tax cut with the Congress.

Like the 2003 law, the 2008 law got the bulk of its short-term GDP boost by advancing tax refunds from the year to come, and delivering them as checks from the IRS to taxpayers. As in 2003, the checks were delivered to taxpayers in the summer (mid-June to early-August), and consumers immediately started spending a portion of their rebates.

Because the 2008 law was a temporary tax cut, taxpayers spent a smaller proportion of it than anyone would have liked. While designing the law, we assumed about 1/3 would be spent, and much of that fairly quickly. The rest would be saved, which is also good but doesn’t help short-term GDP growth. Economists agree that GDP in Q3 and Q4 of 2008 was higher than it otherwise would have been because of the 2008 stimulus law. It was efficient, fast, yet only partially effective, with a smaller GDP boost than we would have liked:

  • efficient – People were again spending their own money on themselves. You get very little waste, and people know what they want and need.
  • fast – Checks were delivered quickly, and much of the spending that did occur happened in Q3, with some in Q4, and with very little left by Q1 of 2009.
  • only partially effective – Because it was a temporary tax cut, people saved a lot of their checks, as we expected. Still we got a GDP bump in Q3 and Q4, and in retrospect we certainly needed it.

The 2008 law was mostly (2) from my list above – a temporary tax cut. Some of the money went to (3), checks to people who didn’t pay income taxes. This was necessary to reach a compromise with a Democratic Congressional leadership that placed a high priority on the distributional effects of the law. Speaker Pelosi insisted that poor people who owed no income taxes still get “rebate” checks, and that high-income taxpayers get nothing. So the 2008 stimulus law was mostly (2) with a little bit of (3).

Now fast forward to January of 2009, when President Obama proposed an enormous fiscal stimulus. The President’s mistake was in largely deferring to Congress on the composition of the stimulus bill. Rather than allowing Congress to pump hundreds of billions of dollars through slow-spending and inefficient bureaucracies, the President should have insisted that Congress instead send all the funds directly to the American people and let them spend it quickly and efficiently. Given his policy preferences, he could have directed a large share of those funds to poor people who don’t pay income taxes. He could have again mislabeled these payments as “tax cuts,” or just correctly labeled them as one-time entitlement payments. I would not have liked that policy, but it would have generated a faster macroeconomic boost than what he allowed Congress to do instead.

Let’s compare the two scenarios. The enacted 2009 stimulus is:

  • effective (eventually) – Most of the spending through government bureaucracies will (eventually) increase GDP. Some of the funds transferred to State governments will be used to offset State spending or tax cuts that otherwise would have occurred, so there’s a loss. But clearly the proportion of the $787 B that will eventually increase GDP will be high, and much higher than if all the funds were given to individuals and families.
  • inefficient – It will be inefficient in two senses. The spending represents the policy preferences of legislators (and all their ugly legislative deals and compromises), rather than the choices of hundreds of millions of Americans who presumably know better how they would like money spent on them. The spending will also be wasteful, and we are starting to see signs of this in the press.
  • s-l-o-o-o-w – CBO says that $25 B of spending had gone into the economy by May 22nd. That’s less than 4% of the total budgetary impact of that bill. Other news reports suggest that about $40 B is in the economy if you include the revenue side. Remember that almost all of the 2008 stimulus was in private hands by August 1. We will get very little GDP boost from fiscal stimulus in Q3 of 2009, and not much in Q4 either. The stimulus will begin to ramp up in Q1 of next year, and be in full swing by Q2 and Q3 of 2010.

Had the President instead insisted that a $787 B stimulus go directly into people’s hands, where “people” includes those who pay income taxes and those who don’t, we would now be seeing a stimulus that would be:

  • partially effective but still quite large – Because it would be a temporary change in people’s incomes, only a fraction of the $787 B would be spent. But even 1/4 or 1/3 of $787 B is still a lot of money to dump out the door. The relative ineffectiveness of a temporary income change would be offset by the enormous amount of cash flowing.
  • efficient – People would be spending money on themselves. Some of them would be spending other people’s money on themselves, but at least they would be spending on their own needs, rather than on multi-year water projects in the districts of powerful Members of Congress. You would have much less waste.
  • fast – The GDP boost would be concentrated in Q3 and Q4 of 2009, tapering off heavily in Q1 of 2010.

Why did the President not do this? Discussions with the Congress began in January before he took office, and he faced a strong Speaker who took control and gave a huge chuck of funding to House Appropriations Chairman Obey (D-WI). I can think of three plausible explanations:

  1. The President and his team did not realize the analytical point that infrastructure spending has too slow of a GDP effect.
  2. They were disorganized.
  3. They did not want a confrontation with their new Congressional allies in their first few days.

I think the Administration now recognizes this problem. Last month when they released a CEA paper “Estimates of Job Creation from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,” the paper danced around the timing of job growth and government outlays in 2009 and 2010. Tips for reporters: (1) ask the Administration to give you OMB estimates of quarterly cash flows for the stimulus law, and (2) ask them to give you the quarterly GDP and job growth estimates behind this CEA paper. I know the first one exists, and I’d bet heavily the second does as well.

Fortunately, CBO Director Doug Elmendorf just gave a presentation titled “Implementation Lags of Fiscal Policy” to the IMF’s conference on fiscal policy. All of the following data are from his presentation.

The final 2009 stimulus law broke down like this:

10-yr total

% of total

Discretionary spending (highways, mass transit, energy efficiency, broadband, education, state aid)

$308 B

39%

Entitlements (food stamps, unemployment, Medicaid, refundable tax credits)

$267 B

34%

Tax cuts

$212 B

27%

Total

$787 B

100%

The problem is that only 11% of the first line (discretionary spending) will be spent by October 1 of this year. In contrast, 31-32% of the entitlement and tax cuts lines will be out the door by that time. (I have questions about the speed of the entitlement part. The bulk of that is Medicaid spending, and it’s not clear to me that a Federal payment to a State means the cash is immediately flowing into the private economy.)

If we extend our window to October 1, 2010, then less than half the discretionary spending will be out the door, while almost 3/4 of the entitlement spending and all of the tax cuts will be out the door and affecting the economy. The largest part of the stimulus law is therefore also the slowest spending part. This is fine if you’re trying to increase GDP growth over the next 2-4 years. If you’re going for short-term GDP growth, it makes no sense.

Director Elmendorf drills down further into discretionary spending and shows that defense spending happens quickly, highways and water extremely slowly:

  • If you allocate $1 to defense spending, 65 cents has been spent within one year.
  • If you allocate $1 to highway spending, 27 cents has been spent within one year.
  • If you allocate $1 to water projects, only 4 cents has been spent within one year.

In fact, the infrastructure spending in the stimulus law will peak in fiscal year 2011, which goes from October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011. That’s too late from a macro perspective.

The Director further points out that the 2009 stimulus law created many new programs. This slows spend-out, as it takes time to create and ramp up the new programs.

The Administration has made much of working with federal and state bureaucracies to find “shovel-ready” projects to accelerate infrastructure spending. All of my conversations with budget analysts suggest this claim is tremendously overblown, and Director Elmendorf asks, “Is this practical on a large scale?”


The 2009 stimulus law will increase U.S. economic growth. But the actuals are matching the budget analysts’ projections for the speed at which that effect will occur.

I would not have liked a stimulus law that would have given cash to people who didn’t pay income taxes. But from a macroeconomic perspective, we need the faster economic growth now. Had the President and his team insisted on giving money to people (taxpayers or not) rather than to bureaucracies, we would be seeing a huge growth spurt in Q3 and Q4 of this year.

It is sad that instead we have to wait until the middle of next year because the White House deferred to Congressional desires to spend on infrastructure. This strategic mistake was avoidable, and the recovery will be delayed because of it.

Wednesday, 3 June 2009|

Parsing the President’s health care reform letter

The White House has released a letter from the President to the two Senate Chairmen who are working on (different) versions of health care reform: Senator Kennedy (D-MA), Chairman of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee, and Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. The letter is dated yesterday and was delivered as part of a White House meeting between the President and Senate Democratic leaders, including the two Chairmen.

This important letter attempts to shape the pending legislation. It makes new proposals, and it tries to set boundaries to constrain the work of the Chairmen. I am going to walk through the letter and explain what I think it means. I will walk through it in sequence, but will cut out the fluff, and occasionally add emphasis in bold. Each of these quotes could merit a post by itself. I will instead provide a survey of the whole letter. The first notable text is the second paragraph:

Soaring health care costs make our current course unsustainable. It is unsustainable for our families, whose spiraling premiums and out-of-pocket expenses are pushing them into bankruptcy and forcing them to go without the checkups and prescriptions they need. It is unsustainable for businesses, forcing more and more of them to choose between keeping their doors open or covering their workers. And the ever-increasing cost of Medicare and Medicaid are among the main drivers of enormous budget deficits that are threatening our economic future.

This is fantastic, especially as 2. He is focusing on health cost growth as the underlying problem, rather than just focusing on the uninsured, which is only one symptom of the problem. I wrote about this in mid-April: By focusing only on covering the uninsured, are we solving the wrong problem? Here’s the key picture from that post. We need to focus on the red box, and not just the blue box.

hc cost flowchart

The President’s letter continues:

We simply cannot afford to postpone health care reform any longer. This recognition has led an unprecedented coalition to emerge on behalf of reform — hospitals, physicians, and health insurers, labor and business, Democrats and Republicans. These groups, adversaries in past efforts, are now standing as partners on the same side of this debate.

There is a less noble explanation for the existence of this coalition. I wrote in mid-May, “

[The provider groups] want to share in the spoils of increased government spending on health care, they want to avoid being the political and policy targets of legislation, and they see no political downside to supporting a popular and powerful President with Democratic supermajorities in both the House and Senate.”

At this historic juncture, we share the goal of quality, affordable health care for all Americans. But I want to stress that reform cannot mean focusing on expanded coverage alone. Indeed, without a serious, sustained effort to reduce the growth rate of health care costs, affordable health care coverage will remain out of reach. So we must attack the root causes of the inflation in health care.

This is an astonishing paragraph from a Democratic President. As he has done in the past, he says his goal is health care for all Americans, rather than health insurance for all Americans. This language will allow him to declare victory with a bill that does not provide universal pre-paid health insurance.

He then reiterates that expanded coverage is insufficient. A bill “must attack the root causes of the inflation in health care.” This is fantastic and unexpected from a Democrat.

The President’s letter then veers wildly off course. That paragraph continues:

… So we must attack the root causes of the inflation in health care. That means promoting the best practices, not simply the most expensive. We should ask why places like the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, and other institutions can offer the highest quality care at costs well below the national norm. We need to learn from their successes and replicate those best practices across our country. That’s how we can achieve reform that preserves and strengthens what’s best about our health care system, while fixing what is broken.

Geographic disparities in health spending are enormous, and if we could somehow magically reduce spending in high-cost areas to match that in low cost areas, without sacrificing too much quality, then we would make major progress in reducing the level of national health spending. Budget Director Peter Orszag is the primary proponent of this argument, since before he entered the Administration.

But the Administration has no plan and no proposals that would actually reduce geographic disparities in health care. They have proposals which would provide people with more information about the health care they use, but they have not proposed to change the incentives people have to use that care. If you don’t change the incentives, you will make no significant progress in reducing geographic spending disparities or slowing health cost growth. I wrote about this in late April: Slowing health cost growth requires information AND incentives, and then found that CBO had already made this point.

More importantly, it is absurd to say that geographic disparities are “the root causes of the inflation in health care.” We know what drives health cost growth: (1) technology, (2) income growth, (3) increases in third party payment, and (4) aging of the population. Some argue that administrative costs also contribute to growth, but I’m skeptical. We also know that the first three reasons account for two-thirds to nearly all of cost growth, depending on which study you prefer.

The President’s letter correctly identifies the problem to be solved as health cost growth, and then completely misdiagnoses the sources of that growth. The Administration continues to grossly foul up the problem definition, not propose a solution, and get a free ride from a lazy and compliant press corps. You cannot slow health spending growth merely by stating a vague intent to do so.

The letter continues:

The plans you are discussing embody my core belief that Americans should have better choices for health insurance, building on the principle that if they like the coverage they have now, they can keep it, while seeing their costs lowered as our reforms take hold.

Two things jump out from this sentence. The first is a clear and oft-repeated signal that “if [you] like the coverage [you] have now, [you] can keep it.” The President says this is a core belief. It also protects the Administration from one of the most effective attacks on expansions of government health care: that it will squeeze our your private care. This is tactically smart.

The second is the return to “seeing their costs lowered as our reforms take hold.” This addresses the first box on the right side in my diagram above, and I compliment the President and his team for identifying that growing health spending hurts the more than 100 million Americans who now have health insurance, and not just those who lack it.

But for those who don’t have such options, I agree that we should create a health insurance exchange … a market where Americans can one-stop shop for a health care plan, compare benefits and prices, and choose the plan that’s best for them, in the same way that Members of Congress and their families can.

  • A (singular) exchange, or 50 State exchanges? There’s a big difference.
  • I have never been enamored of the “one-stop shopping” argument. I’m not opposed to it, it just doesn’t excite me. Mostly I fear that exchanges become vehicles for Washington-directed redistribution.
  • It is fascinating that he takes the traditional liberal argument that “you deserve health care that is good as Members of Congress get,” and turns it into “Americans can … choose the plan that’s best for them, in the same way that Members of Congress and their families can.” This is creative.

None of these plans should deny coverage on the basis of a preexisting condition, …

The hardest problem in health care reform is how to deal with the small percentage of Americans with predictably high health costs. To quote Harvard’s Dr. Kate Baicker:

Uninsured Americans who are sick pose a very different set of problems. They need health care more than health insurance. Insurance is about reducing uncertainty in spending. It is impossible to “insure” against an adverse event that has already happened, for there is no longer any uncertainty. If you were to try to purchase auto insurance that covered replacement of a car that had already been totaled in an accident, the premium would equal the cost of a new car. You would not be buying car insurance – you would be buying a car. Similarly, uninsured people with known high health costs do not need health insurance – they need health care. Private health insurers can no more charge uninsured sick people a premium lower than their expected costs. The policy problem posed by this group is how to ensure that low income uninsured sick people have the resources they need to obtain what society deems an acceptable level of care and ideally, as discussed below, to minimize the number of people in this situation.

We need to distinguish between the uninsured and the uninsurable. The uninsured lack health insurance for a wide variety of reasons. Some uninsured are healthy, some are sick.

The uninsurable are those who are already sick or injured, and who have predictably high future health costs. If you have an incurable disease, you are uninsurable, because there is little uncertainty about your future spending. (I’m oversimplifying -there is little uncertainty that you will have high health costs.) As Kate points out, “Uninsured people with known high health costs do not need health insurance – they need health care.”  The policy problem posed by this group is how to ensure that low income uninsured sick people have the resources they need to obtain what society deems an acceptable level of care.

So when the President says that “None of these plans should deny coverage on the basis of a preexisting condition,” the practical effect is that health insurance plans will be required to provide health care to the uninsurable, label it as “insurance,” and then charge healthy people higher premiums than are merited by their own health status. It’s a way of hiding the cross-subsidization.

… and all of these plans should include an affordable basic benefit package that includes prevention, and protection against catastrophic costs.

The word “basic” is unusual from a Democrat. The traditional Washington health debate has Republicans (generally) arguing that we should want more people to be able to afford access to “basic” health insurance, while Democrats (especially those farther Left) saying everyone has a right to “good” health insurance. Setting aside the access vs. right debate for the moment, the word “basic” is a more centrist choice than I would have expected from this President.

He then runs into one of the classic problems of government-designed health care reform: who defines the benefit package? By saying that all of these plans should include X, he is punting the question of who gets to define X, and how specific will they be?Governments have a terrible track record of political micromanagement of medical benefits.

I strongly believe that Americans should have the choice of a public health insurance option operating alongside private plans.

Note that he chose “I strongly believe that Americans should have” rather than the stronger “Americans must have.” Despite the urgings of the Left, the President is leaving himself room to jettison the “public option” if that is the price of getting the Republican votes he may need. Also, he says “alongside private plans,” again emphasizing that the public option will not, in his view, squeeze out private coverage. I think he’s wrong and it will squeeze out private coverage, and would point to what his Administration is trying to do to Medicare private plans as proof.

I understand the Committees are moving towards a principle of shared responsibility — making every American responsible for having health insurance coverage, and asking that employers share in the cost. I share the goal of ending lapses and gaps in coverage that make us less healthy and drive up everyone’s costs, and I am open to your ideas on shared responsibility. But I believe if we are going to make people responsible for owning health insurance, we must make health care affordable. If we do end up with a system where people are responsible for their own insurance, we need to provide a hardship waiver to exempt Americans who cannot afford it. In addition, while I believe that employers have a responsibility to support health insurance for their employees, small businesses face a number of special challenges in affording health benefits and should be exempted.

This is a fairly hard slap at a mandate (individual or employer). “I understand [you] are moving toward … I share the goal … and I am open to your ideas on shared responsibility” is not a ringing endorsement of a mandate. He then guts the universal nature by saying that it should exempt “Americans who cannot afford it” as well as small businesses. These exemptions would create tremendous distortions and inequities. The resulting patchwork mandate would be a mess. With this paragraph, I think the President weakens the prospect of a mandate becoming law.

Health care reform must not add to our deficits over the next 10 years — it must be at least deficit neutral and put America on a path to reducing its deficit over time. To fulfill this promise, I have set aside $635 billion in a health reserve fund as a down payment on reform. This reserve fund includes a numb

er of proposals to cut spending by $309 billion over 10 years –reducing overpayments to Medicare Advantage private insurers; strengthening Medicare and Medicaid payment accuracy by cutting waste, fraud and abuse; improving care for Medicare patients after hospitalizations; and encouraging physicians to form “accountable care organizations” to improve the quality of care for Medicare patients. The reserve fund also includes a proposal to limit the tax rate at which high-income taxpayers can take itemized deductions to 28 percent, which, together with other steps to close loopholes, would raise $326 billion over 10 years.

I am committed to working with the Congress to fully offset the cost of health care reform by reducing Medicare and Medicaid spending by another $200 to $300 billion over the next 10 years, and by enacting appropriate proposals to generate additional revenues. These savings will come not only by adopting new technologies and addressing the vastly different costs of care, but from going after the key drivers of skyrocketing health care costs, including unmanaged chronic diseases, duplicated tests, and unnecessary hospital readmissions.

  • “It must be at least deficit neutral” – Good.
  • “and [must] put America on a path to reducing its deficit over time” – Even better, if he were to actually propose a policy that might do this. Without such a proposal, this is empty and weak.
  • “I have set aside $635 billion in a health reserve fund as a down payment on reform” – Horrible. He wants to create the entire new obligation, but fund only about half of it.
  • “… cut spending by $309 billion over 10 years” – True, but his budget hides $330 B in additional spending on doctors and $17 B to expand Medicaid, so the net is a Medicare/Medicaid spending increase of $38 billion over 10 years. (See table S-5 on page 121 of the President’s budget.) The President’s budget increases spending on these entitlements, and uses a baseline game to claim budgetary savings to offset a new health entitlement.
  • “… cutting waste, fraud and abuse” – This is the old chestnut to suggest that the cuts are good policy and won’t hurt. There is waste, fraud, and abuse, but the cuts will also involve real reductions in payments to health providers, and they will hurt (which doesn’t make them wrong to do).
  • “… a proposal to limit the tax rate at which high-income taxpayers can take itemized deductions to 28 percent” – Democrats in Congress rejected this months ago.
  • “… by reducing Medicare and Medicaid spending by another $200 to $300 billion over the next 10 years” – Excellent. Will he provide specifics? I would be happy to suggest some.
  • “… and by enacting appropriate proposals to generate additional revenues.”- aka “raise more taxes” – Horrible from my perspective.
  • “… going after the key drivers of skyrocketing health care costs, including unmanaged chronic diseases, duplicated tests, and unnecessary hospital readmissions.” – As I said earlier, these are not the key drivers of skyrocketing health care costs, and it is misleading and irresponsible to claim they are.

To identify and achieve additional savings, I am also open to your ideas about giving special consideration to the recommendations of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), a commission created by a Republican Congress. Under this approach, MedPAC’s recommendations on cost reductions would be adopted unless opposed by a joint resolution of the Congress. This is similar to a process that has been used effectively by a commission charged with closing military bases, and could be a valuable tool to help achieve health care reform in a fiscally responsible way.

This is new and interesting to me. “A commission created by a Republican Congress” is odd, since MedPac is not known as a nonpartisan advisory group. It is also odd to imagine giving MedPac real decision-making authority, given that it is comprised of representatives of provider groups (doctors, hospitals, nurses, etc.)

I know that you have reached out to Republican colleagues, as I have, and that you have worked hard to reach a bipartisan consensus about many of these issues. I remain hopeful that many Republicans will join us in enacting this historic legislation that will lower health care costs for families, businesses, and governments, and improve the lives of millions of Americans. So, I appreciate your efforts, and look forward to working with you so that the Congress can complete health care reform by October.

I can read this either way. My gut says this means, “Get me a bill by October.” I would prefer it be broadly bipartisan, but don’t let the lack of Republican support prevent you from getting me a bill.

Summary & Conclusions

The news in this letter is:

  • The President continues his rhetorical focus on reducing long run health costs in addition to expanding coverage.
  • While appearing to push for a public option and universality, he is leaving himself room to compromise on both if needed to get a bill to his desk.
  • He has made a mandate harder to legislate by insisting on large exemptions, and he has not signaled any support for a mandate. Goodbye mandate, I think.
  • He is insisting on deficit neutrality over 10 years and reducing the deficit in the long run, while not proposing policies that achieve either goal. He is opening the door to more Medicare and Medicaid savings to reach these goals and has floated a $200-$300 B number without specifics.
  • He has opened the door to a binding commission to cut Medicare and Medicaid spending, modeled after the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.

I have mixed conclusions:

  • At the 30,000-foot level, he has broken new ground for Democrats in defining the problem correctly as unsustainable health cost growth, rather than the subsidiary problem of the uninsured. I compliment him for this.
  • At the 5,000-foot level, he botches the problem definition by focusing on geographic disparities while ignoring the commonly acknowledged major drivers of health spending increases: technology, income growth, and third party payment. This is a fatal flaw.
  • He continues to assert that we must slow cost growth, without proposing any policy changes that would do so in a measurable way. This is an abdication of leadership and irresponsible.
  • To genuinely slow health cost growth, you need to change incentives. Doing so involves political pain. Congress will not want to do that pain, and will not do so if the President doesn’t propose specifics.
  • In addition, the short-term budget numbers still don’t add up. He has problems with the “down payment” meaning they’re not paying for the full new obligation, ignoring the doctors and Medicaid spending hidden in the baseline, and Congress rejecting his biggest tax increase proposal.
  • I am glad that he is leaning against, or at least undermining, the case for a mandate.
  • The MedPAC idea is interesting. It probably won’t work, but I don’t want to dismiss it out of hand.

The President’s letter makes it harder, not easier, to get a bill. While I like some elements of the letter, it is inconsistent with the President’s actual proposals. You cannot magically slow health spending growth without proposing policy changes that affect incentives and behavior. If the President is not willing to bite the bullet and lead on slowing long-term health cost growth, he will instead get a bill which is just a straight entitlement expansion, partly offset by Medicare Advantage cuts and tax increases, and obscured by budget gimmicks. His advisors will then have to construct a bogus argument that they have addressed long-term spending growth.

That would be a terrible outcome.

Wednesday, 3 June 2009|

Understanding the GM bankruptcy

Many of you are new to this blog since I wrote extensively about autos six weeks ago. As background, I coordinated the auto loan process for President Bush last fall as the Director of the White House National Economic Council (the position now held by Dr. Lawrence Summers). I wrote a series of posts on the auto loans beginning when the President made his late-March announcements, and continuing into the spring. For reference, here are those posts:

  1. Auto loans: a deadline looms
  2. Auto loans: options for the President
  3. Auto loans: the Bush approach
  4. Auto loans: Chrysler gets an ultimatum, GM gets a do-over
  5. Auto loans: the press forgot to ask about the cost to the taxpayer
  6. Should taxpayers subsidize Chrysler retiree pensions or health care?
  7. The Chrysler bankruptcy sale
  8. Mixed results on the Chrysler announcement

This morning I posted some basic facts on the General Motors announcement. Now it’s time for some analysis. Like my post Understanding the President’s CAFE announcement, this is a monster post. I hope you find it valuable despite its length.

I want to try to tease apart the various questions that get conflated in the public forum. My primary goal is to give you a structure for thinking about the issue. My secondary goal is to persuade you to agree with my views on each question. I will be satisfied if you give me credit for achieving only the primary goal.

Here is how I tease apart the questions:

  1. What are the arguments for further government intervention?
  2. Given these arguments, should the U.S. government intervene further by putting more taxpayer funding at risk to prevent GM from liquidating?
  3. Is the pre-packaged bankruptcy likely to succeed?
  4. Is it fair?
  5. Did the government structure the taxpayer financing correctly?
  6. Will the Administration run GM?

Let’s take them one-by-one.


1. What are the arguments for further government intervention?

Today the President explained why he chose to put another $30.1 B of taxpayer funds at risk to prevent GM from liquidating now. Speaking about his decision on March 30th, he said today:

But I also recognized the importance of a viable auto industry to the well-being of families and communities across our industrial Midwest and across the United States. In the midst of a deep recession and financial crisis, the collapse of these companies would have been devastating for countless Americans, and done enormous damage to our economy — beyond the auto industry. It was also clear that if GM and Chrysler remade and retooled themselves for the 21st century, it would be good for American workers, good for American manufacturing, and good for America’s economy.

This is more expansive than what President Bush argued last December:

In the midst of a financial crisis and a recession, allowing the U.S. auto industry to collapse is not a responsible course of action. The question is how we can best give it a chance to succeed. Some argue the wisest path is to allow the auto companies to reorganize through Chapter 11 provisions of our bankruptcy laws – and provide federal loans to keep them operating while they try to restructure under the supervision of a bankruptcy court. But given the current state of the auto industry and the economy, Chapter 11 is unlikely to work for American automakers at this time.

The distinction is important. President Bush’s arguments were time-dependent: (a) we should try to prevent our weak economy from taking another big hit right now, and (b) let’s buy GM and Chrysler time to get ready to restructure. He also argued (c) that it was unfair to dump a liquidating auto industry on his successor (even if his successor might do something different than he would). It was a “too big to fail now” argument.

Today President Obama made it clear that he made the decision to commit additional funds, if his conditions were met, at the end of March. He then added new reasons to those expressed by President Bush: that America needs “a viable auto industry,” and that it would be good for America if GM and Chrysler survived. While he emphasizes what he would not do, “I refused to let these companies become permanent wards of the state,” President Obama defines a national interest in having auto manufacturers headquartered in the U.S. He reinforced that with his closing line, which was surreal:

And when that happens, we can truly say that what is good for General Motors and all who work there is good for the United States of America.

This is a big expansion of the justification for government intervention in the market. Ford is not failing, and Chrysler is emerging from bankruptcy. President Obama is arguing that American taxpayers need to fund the survival of a third (the biggest) U.S.-based auto manufacturer, because it is important “to the well-being of families and communities across our industrial Midwest and across the United States” and because “it would be good for American workers, good for American manufacturing, and good for America’s economy.” This argument could be extended to almost any large U.S. firm, at almost any time.

My view: I am extremely uncomfortable with the President’s expanded argument for further government intervention. Had the President instead argued, “The economy is beginning to recover, and we cannot jeopardize that with another major shock,” I would have been less uncomfortable with today’s commitment of additional taxpayer funds.


2. Given these arguments, should the U.S. government intervene further by putting more taxpayer funding at risk to prevent GM from liquidating?

The public debate has evolved in the past two months. Earlier this year the question posed was, “Should the Administration bail out GM?” The basic options were “yes,” “no,” and “only if they enter bankruptcy, and if they do they should try to pre-package it.” The President chose the last of these options. The President decided to put $30.1 B of additional taxpayer funding at risk to help prevent GM from liquidating in the near future, and to help them through a restructuring process.

The benefits and costs are similar to what I described in late March. Here’s the updated version:

Benefits

  • If the firm survives the bankruptcy process intact, it has a higher probability of being viable in the long run (than in a restructuring outside of bankruptcy).
  • If the firm survives restructuring, the taxpayer has a higher probability of being repaid.
  • Old equity holders faced the full costs of the firm’s failure (by being wiped out). No additional moral hazard is created.

Costs

  • There are still significant risks to GM’s survival:
    • Will GM and the Administration defeat the objecting unsecured creditors in court? (however unfair that might be)
    • Will the bankruptcy process conclude quickly (within 90 days)?
    • Will GM continue to lose market share? Can GM make cars and trucks that people want to buy?
    • Will the new fuel economy and emissions rules restrict GM’s ability to make attractive vehicles?
  • This is a big new cash outlay from the taxpayer. This costs the taxpayer, and further constrains available TARP funds.

The President made clear his answer to this question on March 30th. At that time he laid out the conditions under which he would provide additional funding, and those conditions were met. No one should be surprised that he is now putting more taxpayer funding at risk. I am surprised that they only need $30 B.

My view: We crossed this bridge back in late March. It is not a new decision today to put more taxpayer funding at risk. I don’t like it, but I am at least glad that some incentives have been restored: the firm has to go through a bankruptcy process, shareholders are wiped out, and management was fired. I remember arguments from last fall and earlier this year that GM should get more taxpayer dollars outside of a bankruptcy process. That would have been far worse, and today’s actions mitigate some moral hazard.

Given the relative strength of the U.S. economy now compared to last December, I would have preferred an outcome of a pre-packaged bankruptcy + private DIP financing, and not exposing taxpayers to any additional risk. If GM is really as viable as GM and the President claim it now is, then they should have no problem convincing capital markets to provide them with short-term financing. (Judge Richard Posner argues this.) I will guess that this was not actually a viable option, because the pre-packaging could only come together with the direct involvement of the government. I think the real options would have been expose taxpayers to $30B more risk, or allow GM to liquidate. I would go with the latter: if GM can’t find private financing, they’re on their own. I assume this means they would liquidate. This would have been harsh and painful for those affected. I believe the consequences of further intervention now are worse for a larger number of people in the long run.


3. Is the pre-packaged bankruptcy likely to succeed?

There are two components to this question:

  • Is the bankruptcy process likely to be quick and successful?
  • Will the resulting company succeed without additional taxpayer aid?

I do not feel well-qualified to comment on the first question. The talking heads all repeat that “GM’s bankruptcy is more complicated than Chrysler’s,” with little detail about why. I would point out that the Administration is one for one in this process. Their use of this part of the bankruptcy code (section 363), and the process where the old GM sells the good stuff to a new GM, and then the remaining parts are liquidated, appears to have worked for Chrysler. From my perspective, the burden of proof now shifts to those who argue this bankruptcy will take more than 90 days. I didn’t like it because of the precedent it set, but I wouldn’t bet against the Administration succeeding again.

Other than the “good for GM is good for America” quote, the biggest surprise in the President’s remarks was how heavily he was betting that a restructured GM will succeed. He could easily have taken the posture, “GM has made some hard decisions, and they have a tough road ahead if they want to survive and succeed.” Instead, he attached his own credibility to GM’s future success and said:

So I’m confident that the steps I’m announcing today will mark the end of an old GM, and the beginning of a new GM; a new GM that can produce the high-quality, safe, and fuel-efficient cars of tomorrow; that can lead America towards an energy independent future; and that is once more a symbol of America’s success.

Even with a cleaned up balance sheet and more taxpayer funding, it is by no means certain that GM will survive for the long run. If GM fails in the next few years, the taxpayers will have lost an additional $30.1 B that the President committed today. In addition, the above quote will come back to haunt the President. I understand wanting to set a positive and optimistic tone. I am confused why he did so at such great political risk to himself.

I found it useful to return to my first post on the autos and review what this new pre-packaged bankruptcy + DIP financing does to the wide range of challenges faced by GM:

Revenues

  • The economic slowdown means fewer vehicles are being purchased from all auto manufacturers, foreign and domestic.
  • Even apart from the economic slowdown, U.S. auto manufacturers have been losing market share over time.
  • This is in part because they made a bet on light trucks versus smaller cars. This product mix doesn’t work when gas prices are high. Think of the proliferation of SUVs in the past 10 years. (Note that this was in part the fault of U.S. government policies. SUVs are technically light trucks, and so they qualify for lower fuel economy requirements.)

Costs & productivity

  • The Detroit 3’s ongoing labor costs are higher than those of foreign-based firms. This is still true when you compare an American worker in a GM plant in Michigan, for instance, with an American worker in a Nissan plant in Mississippi.
  • Productivity is lower in U.S. plants of U.S. firms than it is in U.S. plants of foreign-based firms. Some of this is because of the UAW contract that mandates certain inefficiencies. Some of it is poor management.
  • The Detroit 3 have huge dealer networks that are costly to the manufacturers. These dealer franchises are often protected by state laws that make it hard for the manufacturers to make these networks smaller and more efficient.
  • Auto manufacturers face a burdensome and unpredictable legislative and regulatory environment.

Balance sheets

  • The Detroit 3 have enormous legacy costs from their retirees. Past UAW contracts provided generous benefits that continue to burden these firms. This drains profits (when they earn them) away from productivity-enhancing investments.

So can GM survive, and for how long? Can they profit and flourish, as the President suggests they will?

  • The Administration and GM argue that a restructured GM can break even in a national market of only 10m vehicles sold in America each year. (We’re now around 9.5m/year. “Normal” is around 16m/year.) If accurate, this is astonishing.This would appear to address all three of the bullets under revenues. Addressed? I’m skeptical. I need to review the assumptions in GM’s new plan, especially about market share.
  • I have seen no evidence that GM and UAW have reduced significantly GM’s ongoing labor costs to be competitive with the transplants. Maybe I have missed it. Unaddressed.
  • Productivity is still lower in U.S. plants of U.S. firms that it is in U.S. plants of foreign-based firms. As a result of high compensation costs per worker and low productivity, it appears that labor cost per vehicle produced will still be uncompetitive with the transplants. Unaddressed.
  • GM’s dealer network is being dramatically reduced. Addressed.
  • The CAFE and emissions requirements are even more burdensome than predicted, but now have at least some degree of stability, given the national standards. On net, worse than before.
  • The balance sheets will be relieved of enormous debt and legacy health and pension obligations. Addressed.

My view: I need to look more at what GM is assuming for market share. The removal of the legacy obligations, combined with a big chunk of taxpayer change, will buy then many months of survival.

The Administration is stressing the balance sheet improvements, and they deserve credit for that. Conservative critics focus on the additional burdens of the fuel economy and emissions rules, and they’re right, too.

I would focus even more on the questions asked by several commenters: “Will people want to buy GM cars and trucks?” Additionally, can GM make a profit with still high labor costs, still low productivity, still burdensome work rules, and still slow product development cycles?

I want to GM to survive and be profitable in the long run. Their chances are now drastically improved, assuming they survive bankruptcy. But I don’t know if that’s an improvement from a 1% chance to a 20% chance, or from a 1% chance to an 80% chance. A lot more needs to change beyond just cleaning up the balance sheet, and many of those needed changes are deep-seated in the culture, structures, and processes of America’s third-largest company.


4. Is the pre-packaged bankruptcy fair?

Absolutely not. But I want to be precise in my criticism.

The easiest thing to do in Washington is to criticize the negotiator. “I could have gotten a better deal,” we say. I should begin my expressing my sympathy and offering my congratulations to Steven Rattner and the Obama team for closing what was undoubtedly a complex and difficult set of negotiations. I’m sure this one was not easy, and theirs was a thankless task.

At the same time, I share the concerns of many that the deal was not even-handed, and that the precedent will damage future business lending. I have grave concerns about how far they were willing to stretch bankruptcy processes and the traditional capital structure to get a deal.

First I need to correct the Administration, as well as some bad reporting today by the Washington Post. In last night’s background briefing for the press, an unnamed Senior Administration Official claimed (emphasis added):

Secondly, as you know, the UAW has reached a new agreement with GM and that agreement has been ratified that involves significant concessions by the UAW … concessions that are in virtually every respect more aggressive than what the previous administration demanded in its loan agreement.

In the term sheet for the December loan we (the Bush Administration) made to General Motors, we set out “targets,” which we took directly from the Corker amendment offered the week prior on the Senate floor:

  1. Reduce outstanding unsecured debt by not less than 2/3 through conversion into equity or other debt;
  2. Reduce the total amount of compensation, including wages and benefits, paid to their U.S. employees so that, by no later than December 31, 2009, the average of such total amount, per hour and per person, is an amount that is competitive with the average total amount of such compensation, as certified by the Secretary of Labor, paid per hour and per person to employees of Nissan Motor Company, Toyota Motor Corporation, or American Honda Motor Company whose site of employment is in the United States.
  3. Eliminate the jobs bank.
  4. Apply work rules no later than 12/31/09 “in a manner that is competitive with Nissan … Toyota or Honda in the U.S.”
  5. Not less than half of their VEBA payment should be in the form of stock.

As best I can tell:

  • They more than accomplished target #1.
  • They did little to nothing on #2. I have seen no evidence that compensation of current workers has been changed. UAW Chief Ron Gettelfinger claimed in a message to his members, “For our active members these tentative changes mean no loss in your base hourly pay, no reduction in your health care, and no reduction in pensions.” Maybe there’s a distinction between this statement and “total compensation.” If so, it would be great if someone could help me understand this. But it appears GM and UAW did nothing to address target #2.
  • UAW agreed to #3 in late March.
  • They made no apparent progress on target #4. I have neither seen nor heard evidence that the work rules have been relaxed. I am happy to be corrected.
  • They accomplished #5.

It was incorrect for the Senior Administration Official to call these “demands” of the Bush Administration. They were targets, not hard conditions. It is an overstatement to say that they “are in virtually every respect more aggressive than what the previous Administration demanded,” unless “virtually every respect” means “except for compensation and work rules.” (I am happy to be corrected if I have just missed the changes.)

The Washington Post then further flubbed it by writing:

Critics say it is unfair that the restructuring plan gives the union health trust a larger share of the new GM than the bondholders. But administration officials defend the plan, offering several justifications.

First, they note that the terms of the proposed GM restructuring echo the terms laid out by the Bush administration in December, when it extended $13.4 billion in loans to GM.

The Bush administration’s loan agreement required a 50 percent reduction or “haircut” for the union trust, but a 66 percent cut for the bondholders. The Obama deal requires larger cuts for both sides, though more for the bondholders.

The agreement does more than meet three of the five targets laid out by the Administration. It appears to make no progress on the other two targets. Thus the terms do not “echo the terms laid out by the Bush administration in December.”

More importantly, the targets we (Bush team) laid out said nothing about the distribution of equity shares. The criticism is not that the deal doesn’t cut the VEBA enough, or reduce unsecured debt enough. The criticism is that someone lower in the capital structure (UAW’s VEBA) got a much greater equity share than someone higher in the structure (unsecured creditors). It is disingenuous to point to the targets in the Bush Administration’s December loans to justify this inequity.

The deal is unfair to unsecured creditors, because they get a worse deal than someone standing behind them in line (the UAW’s VEBA). It has nothing to do with who those parties are (labor vs. creditors). It is about the importance of maintaining a stable and predictable set of rules to govern the capital structure of a firm, and the value that stability creates for firms’ ability to raise capital. All these arguments boil down to the cardinal rule of waiting in line for the kindergarten bus: it’s not fair to cut in line. If that rule is broken too often, chaos ensues.

The Administration could be arguing, “Sure it’s unfair, but UAW had more leverage on us than the creditors, so we struck the best deal that we could. We needed UAW to sign onto the deal, while we thought we could roll the creditors in court.” This would better justify the disproportionate equity shares than claiming, “This is a fair deal.”

The objecting creditors will now defend their rights in court. If the Chrysler precedent is an example, you should bet against them. It is interesting that the President did not attack them as “speculators” this time, so at least the rhetorical leverage against them is weakened.

My view: I am more concerned with the signals this unfair treatment sends to future investors. I worry that the President’s actions create political risk and will permanently raise the cost of capital for certain firms. I wish I knew whether a different prepackaging was possible, one which would have maintained the precedence of the capital structure and did not stretch the bankruptcy process again. Unfortunately, it is impossible to know.


5. Did the government structure the taxpayer financing correctly?

Judge Richard Posner argues the government should have provided a loan rather than taken an equity stake in GM. The President suggested one reason why they preferred an equity stake: a loan would further burden GM with a stream of near-term interest payments to the government.

I think Judge Posner strikes a nerve with his suggestion. It seems that much of the public discomfort comes from the government now being the owner of GM. It’s the 60% number that made me gasp. It highlights a tradeoff between two goals on which conservatives focus: value for the taxpayer, and avoiding government interference and control. There is a tradeoff between the two.

I believe the U.S. government could auction its equity shares late this year and divest itself completely from General Motors.This would solve the government ownership problem. In doing so, I presume that taxpayers would recoup far less than the $30 B of cash provided.

Question for conservatives: How much of a loss are you willing to take on the $30 B to get the U.S. government out of GM quickly?

My view: I assume there is a non-trivial chance that GM may still fail in the next several years. I like the President’s and his team’s strong language today that this $30 B is the last taxpayer aid, but I would like to reinforce that by ending the government’s ongoing involvement in GM as quickly as possible. I am willing to sacrifice a significant portion of the $30 B to achieve that goal. I therefore recommend that, if GM emerges from bankruptcy, the Administration then establish a much more rapid timetable for selling its equity stake, even if that means the taxpayer loses much of the $30 B. Get us out of GM before the end of 2010. This will strengthen the bulwark against providing additional taxpayer funds if GM fails again.

Note:

  • Under current law, the authority to provide any firm with additional TARP funding expires December 31, 2009. Correction: Secretary Geithner can, after notifying Congress, extend the TARP authorities to October 3, 2010.
  • The “set a timeline” argument has direct parallels to a certain national security debate.

6. Will the Administration run GM?

Here I give the Administration credit for good intent and good initial execution. I take at face value the President’s statement that he does not want to run or control GM, and I give him points for saying so explicitly. I am sure there are others, including some in his Administration and some on Capitol Hill, that would love to run GM as Government Motors. I will trust the President when he says he is not one of those people.

I further give the Administration credit for the “Principles for Managing Ownership Stake” they released in today’s fact sheet. While they are being released in the specific context of the U.S. government’s new equity stake in GM, the White House writes more generally “(T)he Obama Administration has established four core principles that will guide the government’s management of ownership interests in private firms.”

  • The government has no desire to own equity stakes in companies any longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose of its ownership interests as soon as practicable. Our goal is to promote strong and viable companies that can quickly be profitable and contribute to economic growth and jobs without government involvement.
  • In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is necessary to respond to a company’s request for substantial assistance, the government will reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability and encourage growth. When necessary, these conditions may include restructurings similar to that now underway at GM as well as changes to ensure a strong board of directors that selects management with a sound long-term vision to restore their companies to profitability and to end the need for government support as quickly as is practically feasible.
  • After any up-front conditions are in place, the government will protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner. The government will not interfere with or exert control over day-to-day company operations. No government employees will serve on the boards or be employed by these companies.
  • As a common shareholder, the government will only vote on core governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors and major corporate events or transactions. While protecting taxpayer resources, the government intends to be extremely disciplined as to how it intends to use even these limited rights.

Given that I trust the President’s statements on this point, the risks here are unintended consequences, from within his own Administration and from the Congress. They are big risks, and these are dangerous waters. I hope the Administration treads carefully.

My view: Given the undesirable situation of government equity stakes in, and even controlling ownership of, firms like GM and AIG, as well as potentially Citigroup and other banks, these are good principles. They are also easy to monitor. It is interesting and good that the White House fact sheet says, “The

[UAW’s] VEBA will have the right to select one independent director and will have no right to vote its shares or other governance rights.” (emphasis added)

I urge the President to:

  • Enshrine the principles from today’s fact sheet in the term sheets for the taxpayer investments in GM (and other firms). We did this last December in the GM and Chrysler term sheets. Tie yourself to the mast. This will give you an easy excuse later when someone pressures you to vote those shares in a way that conflicts with the taxpayer’s interest.
  • Set clear rules for Administration contacts with GM – it’s probably best to funnel all contacts through specific Treasury or NEC officials on the autos task force. No freelancing phone calls to the Administration-appointed directors or “informal chats” with them from White House staff, or from DOT, EPA, USTR, DOE, even State. Put a firewall around interactions with GM.
  • Come out hard and quickly against the first proposal from a Member of Congress to leverage the ownership stake for a non-taxpayer goal. Nip it in the bud, especially if the idea comes from a friend.

It’s easy to criticize a huge decision like the one made by the President today. I strongly disagree with where we are headed, and I am concerned with the precedent that this deal sets for capital investment in American firms. The alternative, however, is that you have to be willing to allow GM to fail. I would be willing to do so, and it is therefore easy for me to express my views. In summary, they are:

  1. I am extremely uncomfortable with the President’s expanded argument for today’s government intervention.
  2. My first choice would have been to push GM to get private DIP financing. Assuming that was infeasible, I would have recommended denying GM the DIP financing, even if that meant they would liquidate. The economy is sufficiently healthier now than it was last December that I would be willing to risk the additional shock. But I agree the President crossed this bridge at the end of March.
  3. I would bet in favor of GM emerging from bankruptcy, and against them surviving as an intact firm for 5 years without additional taxpayer funding.
  4. The pre-packaging deal was unfair to unsecured creditors, to the benefit of UAW retirees. The Administration loses credibility with me by trying to argue this was a fair deal. They would have been more credible if they had argued it was the only deal they could get. I worry that the President’s actions create political risk and will permanently raise the cost of capital for certain U.S. firms.
  5. If a loan rather than an equity purchase had been possible, I would have preferred that – I find Judge Posner’s arguments persuasive. Given the equity investment, I urge the Administration to divest as quickly as possible, even if it means a loss to the taxpayer.
  6. Given the undesirable situation of the U.S. government owning GM and other large firms, the Administration’s new “Principles for Managing Ownership Stake” are solid. They need to lock them in, and corral or beat back all those people who work in the Executive Branch and Congress who have other goals in mind for GM and will be tempted to exert some leverage.

I thank you for making it through this extremely long post, and again want to thank all of the fantastic commenters. If you dislike the President’s announcement, I urge you to consider this question: Suppose the deal announced today were the only possible pre-packaged bankruptcy, and your choice was to take it or allow GM to liquidate now. What would you do?

Monday, 1 June 2009|

Basic facts on the General Motors bankruptcy

In a few hours I will offer my thoughts and reactions to the General Motors bankruptcy filing and the President’s noon announcement. For now, here is what I have been able to figure out from the White House fact sheet and secondary source reporting through CNBC and the Wall Street Journal. I assume that both sources are being fed directly from the White House, Treasury, and GM, so I think there is a high probability these sources are accurate.

Note that I do not generally intend to become a news source. I will instead focus on analysis. What you see below is a variant of something I whipped up this morning for my old Administration colleagues that I thought I would share with you as well.

In my experience both on the White House and on Capitol Hill, I found that it was sometimes helpful to my principal to collect and group information as you see it below. There are a lot of good reporters, but they sometimes structure their stories in ways that make it hard to understand. TV business news tends to release the information as it comes out. So while you could learn everything below from the WSJ, CNBC, and the fact sheet, I hope that the structure makes it easier to process.

This is the kind of presentation I might have dashed off for President Bush or Senator Lott for a big news item so they would not have to spend time digging through press coverage. This is one of those “fold it up and put it in your inside jacket pocket” memos. Also, as a principal it’s nice to know what you need to know. You can have the confidence that, if you know this information, you have a basic but thorough understanding of what’s going on. (Hint to my Hill friends: feel free to use this for your boss. You just saved an hour.)

Process
  • GM’s bankruptcy filing was expected to be at 8 AM EDT in NY Southern District in Manhattan. (CNBC)
  • Obama and GM CEO Fritz Henderson are scheduled to hold back-to-back press conferences beginning at noon today. (CNBC)
  • They are using the same Section 363 process that Chrysler used. The new GM buys the good parts of the old GM. The old parts are liquidated. (White House fact sheet)
  • “would allow a much smaller GM to emerge from court protection in as little as 60 to 90 days.” (CNBC) (This is a guess/spin. How optimistic is it? GM is much harder than Chrysler. -kbh)
  • “Al Koch, a managing director at advisory firm AlixPartners, will be appointed chief restructuring officer in charge of liquidating those GM assets” (CNBC)
  • “Autos task force will stay in business … shifting to an investment manager role” (CNBC)
In “the new GM,” ownership is:
  • 60% of equity goes to the U.S. Government. USG also gets $8.8B in debt and preferred stock.
  • UAW’s retiree pension/health plan (the “Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association”) gets 17.5% of equity, plus:
    • warrants to buy another 2.5% of equity;
    • a $2.5 B note (three installments, ending in 2017); and
    • $6.5 B in perpetual preferred stock (9% coupon).
  • Approximately 12% of equity goes to the Canadian (and Ontario?) governments. They also get about $1.7 B in debt and preferred stock.
  • Bondholders of old GM get about 10% of the equity, for giving up $27.1 B in unsecured debt. This was approved by bondholders representing 54% of unsecured debt. The other 46% are the biggest risk for the bankruptcy filing. (CNBC, WSJ)
  • “Bondholders could take up to 25 percent of GM if it recovers to be worth what it was in 2004, before it began round after round of cost-cutting in what proved to be a failed bid to make up for lost sales.” (I need to understand this better.)
  • Secured bondholders expect to be paid face value. (WSJ)
Governance of the new GM
  • UAW’s VEBA can select one independent director, but cannot vote its shares or other governance rights(!) (White House fact sheet)
  • “Canadian government will have the right to select one initial director.” (White House fact sheet)
  • “The U.S. Treasury will also have the right to appoint the initial directors other than those that will be selected by the VEBA and the Canadian government.” (White House fact sheet)
GM gets about $40 B of new cash to help pay its bills during bankruptcy. This is called debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.
  • U.S. Government: $30.1 B in new debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. (WH fact sheet, CNBC)
  • Governments of Canada & Ontario: $9.5 B
NewCo / OldCo

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  • “Today GM is announcing its intention to close 11 facilities and idle another 3 facilities.” (White House fact sheet)
  • [GM] has not provided an update target for job cuts but had been looking to cut 21,000 factory jobs from the 54,000 UAW workers it now employs in the United States.” (CNBC)
  • “While the ‘new GM’ is expected to emerge quickly from court protection, the automaker’s shuttered plants, stranded equipment and other spurned assets would be left to liquidation in bankruptcy.” (CNBC)
  • Previously announced: “closing more than a dozen factories and shedding the Pontiac, Saturn, Saab and Hummer brands.” (WSJ)
  • GM will “shutter 2,600 dealers.” (WSJ)
  • “The new GM will also pursue a commitment to build a new small car in an idled UAW factory.” (WH fact sheet)
  • GM will shed more than $79B in debt. (WSJ)
  • “GM at the last minute also found buyers for some unwanted subsidiaries, including German-based Opel, which is being acquired by a consortium led by Canadian auto-parts supplier Magna International Inc., and the Hummer brand, whose buyer remained undisclosed.”
  • Future
    • “The U.S. Treasury does not anticipate providing any additional assistance to GM beyond this [new $30.1 B] commitment.” (White House fact sheet)
    • “As a result of this restructuring, GM will lower its breakeven point to a 10 million annual car sales environment. Before the restructuring, GM’s breakeven point was in excess of 16 million annual car sales.” (White House fact sheet)
    • “The administration said the goal of the restructuring was to help GM be profitable in a year when the industry sells 10 million vehicles, versus the 16 million it sold in 2007.” (CNBC)
    • “GM will continue to honor consumer warranties.” (WH fact sheet)
    • GM is being removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average 30 (“the Dow”), along with Citigroup. They will be replaced by Cisco and Travelers. (CNBC)

    Update: If you’re really into this topic, you can read the Administration’s background briefing (for the press) that they held last night.

    Monday, 1 June 2009|

    Working in the West Wing: Senior Staff

    I promised I would write about what it’s like to work in the West Wing of the White House. After more than six years of working there, the process details seem less than fascinating to me, but conversations with friends suggest that even routine process explanations might be interesting to some readers.

    I should qualify this by acknowledging that each White House is different, reflecting both the character and the management style of the particular President. I was tremendously privileged to work for one President (George W. Bush) under two Chiefs of Staff (Andy Card and Joshua Bolten), from August of 2002 through January of 2009. I do not argue that the Obama White House should do things the way that we did, or that our way was better. I am merely describing how we did it for those who might care.  So for all you CSPAN junkies and West Wing watchers, here is the first in a series of posts about some process mechanics of working in the West Wing of the (Bush 43) White House.

    Commissioned Officers

    White House staff can be divided into two groups: commissioned officers, and everyone else. As a technical matter, a commissioned officer works for the President, and everyone else in the White House works for a commissioned officer. There are three levels of commissioned officers. Starting with the most senior, they are:

    1. Assistant to the President (AP)
    2. Deputy Assistant to the President (DAP), aka “Deputies”
    3. Special Assistant to the President (SAP), aka “Specials” or “SAPs”

    We had about 20 AP’s at any given time, with a little fluctuation. Here are some examples:

    • Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten
    • Assistant to the President and Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove
    • Assistant to the President and Counselor to the President Ed Gillespie
    • Assistant to the President and Press Secretary Dana Perino
    • Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President Fred Fielding
    • Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Dan Meyer
    • Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director, National Economic Council Keith Hennessey

    Each of us was an assistant to the President. As a formal matter, he was our boss, and we 20 or so AP’s were his direct reports.Note that not all AP’s are equal. As a formal matter there’s a Chief of Staff who is senior to all other staff, and we had two Deputy Chiefs of Staff as well. In a few cases, there was an AP reporting to an AP — at the National Security Council, the #1 and #2 people both had AP rank. And as an informal matter, some AP’s have more practical impact than others, as you might expect in any organization.

    Each AP runs part of the White House staff, and has commissioned officers and non-commissioned staff reporting to him or her. The National Economic Council (NEC) had 1.5 deputies (I’ll explain the .5 another time) and 4-6 Specials. As an example, in 2006 we had at the NEC:

    • AP for Economic Policy and Director, NEC Al Hubbard
    • DAP for Economic Policy and Deputy Director, NEC Keith Hennessey
    • SAP for Economic Policy Chuck Blahous (Social Security)
    • SAP for Economic Policy Julie Goon (Health)
    • SAP for Economic Policy Bryan Corbett (Domestic Finance)
    • SAP for Economic Policy Jason Thomas (Tax & Budget)
    • SAP for Economic Policy Hunter Moorhead (Agriculture)

    We also had substantive experts on other issues (e.g., Technology and Telecommunications) who were not commissioned officers. And we had 8-12 noncommissioned staff, split about evenly between policy aides and support staff.

    The Deputies and Specials also technically report to the President, and they get their commissions from the President (“Special Assistant to the President“). They report to him through an AP, however. As an example, every item on the President’s schedule had a “project officer” who was an AP that was formally responsible for that segment of the President’s day. As a practical matter, the Deputies and Specials did much of the spade work to make that time segment successful, with the AP overseeing the process and working on strategic issues.

    I spent most of my White House time (5 1/2 years) as the NEC Deputy, and a bit over a year (2008) as the NEC AP. I used to joke that “Assistants make the key strategic recommendations to the President and decisions, Specials are the experts, and Deputies make everything happen.” White House meetings would often segment by level. In our economic policy development process, we would often have a series of policy meetings at three levels:

    • In 2007, SAP for Economic Policy Julie Goon (Health) would chair a Policy Coordinating Committtee (PCC) meeting (or three) of White House SAPs and Assistant Secretaries from Cabinet Agencies. Julie’s meetings would tee issues up for …
    • … a Deputies meeting that I would chair (when I was the NEC Deputy), with White House Deputies and more senior Agency staff (like Deputy Secretaries) attending (as well as Julie). My deputies meeting would tee issues up for …
    • … a Principals meeting that the NEC AP would chair (in this example, Al Hubbard), with White House AP’s and Cabinet Secretaries (e.g., Secretary of Health and Human Services Mike Leavitt and Budget Director Jim Nussle) attending. Julie and I would also attend, since it was an NEC meeting. The Principals meeting would tee issues up for …
    • … a Policy Time meeting with the President in the Oval Office or the Roosevelt Room, generally attended by the same people who attended the Principals meeting.

    Andy Card always used to say that White House staff work “at the pleasure of the President, and for the time being.” This apparently repetitive statement was intended to emphasize how ephemeral our employment status was, in contrast to, for instance, a career civil servant with all sorts of legal protections. White House staff, and in particular commissioned officers, have no formal job security. And the hours are brutal.

    At the same time, there are a few perks that come with being a commissioned officer:

    • You get a nice commission, signed by the President and the Secretary of State. Most staff would hang their commision on their office wall. Those with multiple commissions (often from prior Administrations) would generally hang all of them.
    • White House Mess sit-down privileges are for commissioned officers and Cabinet-rank officials.
    • The in-town transportation service, run by top-notch Army personnel, is available only for commissioned staff.
    • Technically, you get the title “The Honorable John Doe.” I don’t know anyone who actually used this, but some friends and relatives think it’s cool.

    As a legal and organizational matter, the White House is a subset of the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The Executive Office of the President also includes some organizations that are not part of the White House, but are close to the President in a physical and practical way. So the grouping of about 25 “White House Senior Staff” includes:

    • All 20-ish Assistants to the President
    • The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (Eddie Lazear in 2008)
    • The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Jim Nussle in 2008)
    • The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (Jim Connaughton for eight years!)
    • The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (Jack Marburger for eight years)

    There are some minor differences between the 20 AP’s and the other four, but they are truly minor. As a practical matter, this group of about two dozen comprises the White House senior staff that report to and directly assist the President on a daily basis.

    I found it interesting how few people understand this most basic tiered structure of the senior White House staff. Then again, I worked on Capitol Hill for more than seven years, and had no idea about this structure until I moved into the White House. What you should remember is that when you see a (current or former) White House staffer on TV or in the press, look carefully at their title. If it says “Assistant to the President for ______,” then you know they are (or were) White House “senior staff,” with a tremendous amount of influence. If you see “Deputy Assistant to the President,” you’ve stepped down one tier, and “Special Assistant to the President,” you have stepped down two tiers. Don’t get me wrong — Deputies and SAPs can be tremendously powerful and influential. But we alumni are always keeping track of “Who’s the ________ Deputy” or “Who got the ________ SAP job” in the Obama White House, and we have these tiers in mind as we observe and analyze the Obama White House decision-making structure.

    (photo credit: Tom Lohdan)

    Friday, 29 May 2009|

    The Smoot-Krugman carbon import tariff

    I wrote last Friday about the China/India hole in the American climate strategy:

    America appears to lack a high-probability strategy for how to get China, India, and Russia to agree to self-impose a significant positive carbon price.

    The Administration and its Congressional allies are trying to impose a significant carbon price in the U.S. through something like the Waxman-Markey bill, while entering an international negotiation process in which as much as 60% of global carbon emissions could face little to no carbon price. The likely outcome would dramatically tilt the global economic playing field, harming U.S. workers and firms relative to their counterparts in China and India.At the same time, it would make little progress toward addressing the risk of severe global climate change, as a large portion of global carbon emissions would remain effectively uncapped.

    In that post I identified two questions that American policymakers need to answer to fill that hole. The first of those was:

    What tools should we use to try to convince the government of China to impose a positive carbon price as part of a global effort? (choose one or more)

    1. Leadership: U.S. goes first and self-imposes a price. Then we use diplomacy to try to convince the Chinese to do the same.
    2. Carrots: The U.S. pays the Chinese to reduce their emissions.
    3. Sticks: The U.S. imposes import tariffs on Chinese goods as long as the government China does not impose a carbon price.

    I now see that I was eight days behind Dr. Paul Krugman in identifying this challenge. On May 14th, he wrote in his New York Times column “Empire of Carbon“:

    (T)he people I talk to are increasingly optimistic that Congress will soon establish a cap-and-trade system that limits emissions of greenhouse gases, with the limits growing steadily tighter over time. And once America acts, we can expect much of the world to follow our lead.

    … But that still leaves the problem of China, where I have been for most of the last week. … But China cannot continue along its current path because the planet can’t handle the strain. … And the growth of emissions from China … already the world’s largest producer of carbon dioxide … is one main reason for this new pessimism.

    I’d like to compare where I think Dr. Krugman stands on various elements of the strategic question I posed, and compare them with my own views. We differ in our concern about the risks and costs of severe climate change, and that difference leads us to radically different policy recommendations.

    I should state at the outset my views on the science and risk of climate change. There is a significant amount of evidence that there is a long-term risk of severe climate change. But there is little discussion about the numbers: How big of a risk? How much warmer? How quickly? How certain are we? And the numbers matter a lot. If we knew with certainty that Earth would warm 10 degrees over the next 20-30 years, I would be screaming for an immediate big carbon tax. If instead we think Earth is likely to warm one degree over the next century or two, then climate change is a trivial concern and we needn’t worry about it. The problem is that nobody knows where we are between these two extremes. This uncertainty matters a lot, and it makes the problem hard.

    Given this uncertainty, I believe there is a small but non-trivial risk that there will be severe climate change over the next century or two. And so I am willing to consider significant and effective policy actions to slow the growth of greenhouse gas emissions to reduce that risk. I do not, however, believe that risk is so great or so certain that we must immediately commit to drastic changes in our economy, or that we must ignore the costs of those policy actions. I treat this like any other policy question: Given tremendous quantitative uncertainty, what are the marginal costs and benefits of our current emissions path, compared with various recommended policy options? I will quantify my thinking on these questions in a separate post. I am willing to consider policies to set a domestic carbon price, if I can be convinced that they’re worth it and will work. So far I have not seen any carbon pricing proposal that I think (a) would have benefits that exceed the costs, and (b) is feasible in the real world of nation-states with differing national interests. But I’m open to suggestions.

    For now, let’s focus on two different answers to the China/India question in the American climate strategy.

    • Dr. Krugman appears to believe that, if China does not slow its global greenhouse emissions growth, actions by the rest of the world will be insufficient to significantly slow global emissions. Krugman: “In January, China announced that it plans to continue its reliance on coal as its main energy source and that to feed its economic growth it will increase coal production 30 percent by 2015.” That’s a decision that, all by itself, will swamp any emissions reductions elsewhere.” I agree with him on this point.
    • I agree with Dr. Krugman’s read of the official Chinese position: “So what is to be done about the China problem? Nothing, say the Chinese. Each time I raised the issue during my visit, I was met with outraged declarations that it was unfair to expect China to limit its use of fossil fuels.” This is consistent with what I know about the Chinese position from our Administration negotiators in 2007 and 2008 , and with what the Financial Times reported last Friday: “Beijing reiterated its belief that developing countries, including China, should curb emissions on a voluntary basis, and only if the cuts ‘accord with their national situations and sustainable development strategies.'” Translation: We’re not setting a domestic carbon price. The Chinese are proposing that the U.S. and other rich nations choose answer (B) Carrots from my menu above: rich countries pay China to reduce their emissions.
    • It appears that Dr. Krugman believes Chinese leaders will not be swayed by option (A) Leadership: “And once America acts, we can expect much of the world to follow our lead.” But that still leaves the problem of China – I largely agree with him on this point.
    • Dr. Krugman appears to presume that we must slow the growth of global greenhouse gas emissions starting now. I disagree with Dr. Krugman on this point, and am more persuaded by Dr. Bjorn Lomborg. The state of technology is such that economic costs of near-term emissions reductions are high, and the long-term climate benefits are small. As an example, Dr. Lomborg estimates that $1 expended through the Kyoto agreement would produce the equivalent of about 30 cents of long-term climate benefits. To the extent you believe long-term climate change must be addressed, we are better off devoting resources to technology pushes that try to reduce the cost of carbon-reducing technologies. The less expensive these technologies, the easier it is for everyone to make significant emissions reductions, and the easier it would be to get a global emissions reduction agreement that includes China and India (presuming you think such an agreement is necessary).
    • Since Dr. Krugman believes that we must persuade the Chinese to change their growth path “because the planet can’t handle the strain,” he appears to conclude that we should threaten a carbon import tariff. His phrasing is quite careful, but he is clearly floating the idea:

    As the United States and other advanced countries finally move to confront climate change, they will also be morally empowered to confront those nations that refuse to act. Sooner than most people think, countries that refuse to limit their greenhouse gas emissions will face sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on their exports. They will complain bitterly that this is protectionism, but so what? Globalization doesn’t do much good if the globe itself becomes unlivable.

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  • Technically, Dr. Krugman does not say (1) the U.S. (2) should propose (3) a carbon import tariff. He instead predicts that “sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on their exports” will be imposed by unnamed countries “sooner than most people think.” By itself, this is only a prediction. But in the following two bolded sentences, he endorses such “sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on
    [Chinese] exports” by unnamed countries. With this clever phrasing, Dr. Krugman has floated an aggressive but ultimately deniable policy proposal: a carbon import tariff.
  • I believe there are cures that are worse than the disease. An import tariff would be protectionist (Dr. Krugman concedes this point). In the context of a global climate change negotiation in which different countries are establishing different domestic carbon prices, and in which two of the world’s largest economies (China and India) refuse to do the same, it is easy to see how a carbon import tariff by the U.S. could set off a global trade war, with potentially devastating effects on the world economy. It appears that Dr. Krugman is willing to bear the increased risk of a global trade war for the benefit of an increased probability that China (and India?) will slow their greenhouse gas emissions. I am not.
  • For completeness, my answer to my own strategic question is “(D) None of the above.”

    • Even if the U.S. establishes a domestic carbon price through a cap-and-trade or carbon tax, diplomacy alone will be unable to convince the Chinese and Indian leaders to do the same in their countries. Option (A) Diplomacy won’t work by itself.
    • Without reductions in Chinese and Indian emissions, I expect that the total climate benefits of the likely global reductions in future emissions growth would not be worth the economic costs to the U.S. of a domestic carbon price (in the near term).
    • I oppose the U.S. paying large developing countries like China and India to reduce their emissions. I am confident the U.S. Congress would agree with this view. Option (B) will not happen in the U.S., nor should it.
    • Because I think the risks of significant damage from severe climate change are small, and the costs of near-term emissions reductions using current technology are high, and because I am deeply concerned that a carbon import tariff might provoke a global trade war, I strongly oppose option (C) Sticks, including any form of carbon import tariff. Free trade, including with China, is more important to me than the possibility of creating leverage on Chinese leaders to try to change their energy development path.
    • We are not talking about small numbers here. China thinks developed countries should contribute 1/2 to 1 percent of GDP to help poorer countries cut their emissions, and the economic effects of domestic carbon prices are measured in the same orders of magnitude. When you’re measuring things in percent of GDP, you’re shooting with real bullets. I oppose imposing such a tariff, threatening one, or even floating the idea as Dr. Krugman has done.
    • Therefore, I conclude the best policy is for the U.S. not to impose a domestic carbon price in the near future. To the extent policymakers believe severe climate change is a risk that should be addressed, I instead recommend they focus on pushing carbon-reducing technology R&D, and reducing tariffs and other trade barriers to the exchange of such technologies, as Dan Price has recommended.
    • I would be comfortable with the U.S. contributing taxpayer funds to a joint international R&D effort, if it were an alternative to a domestic carbon price, and as long as U.S. firms maintained their property rights to such research.

    I have tremendous respect for Dr. Krugman’s past work as an international economist. I am surprised that he is willing to risk a global trade war, and that he would apparently fire the first shot when the global economy is so weak.

    Friday, 29 May 2009|

    Unpacking the Climate-Industrial Complex

    The House Energy & Commerce Comittee reported legislation last Friday that would create a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gas emissions in the United States. I’d like to expand a bit on some recent writings by Bjorn Lomborg and Greg Mankiw about this topic. Dr. Lomborg wrote in last Friday’s Wall Street Journal about a developing “Climate-Industrial Complex,” and Greg has proposed a Fundamental Theorem of Carbon Taxation:

    cap-and-trade = carbon tax + corporate welfare

    Why would a firm support legislation that would raise power costs, increase regulatory burdens, and slow GDP growth? I can think of six reasons:

    1. We are noble and altruistic: Your firm’s leadership is genuinely concerned about the threat of severe climate change and what it could mean for the world.
    2. We need to buy a seat at the legislative bargaining table: You believe that legislation is likely to happen and directly affect your firm, probably in a bad way. You think that by publicly supporting legislation, you will be better able to influence the legislative process. You are trying to buy access to the key Members and Congressional staff so you can get emissions credits or avoid pain. This is Greg’s corporate welfare point, and a core element of Mr. Lomborg’s Climate-Industrial Complex argument.
    3. We make money if carbon is more expensive: If you produce wind turbines or build nuclear power plants, then a carbon price is good for business. If you’re a power company that produces relatively low-carbon fuel relative to your competitors, then you benefit from a high carbon price. Or if you’re a manufacturer that gets its power from a low-carbon source, and your competitors are in coal country, then they are harmed and you are (relatively) helped by a carbon price.
    4. We make money if power costs increase in the U.S.: You’re a foreign firm with operations heavy in European countries that already have a carbon price. You would like to level the playing field by creating a carbon price in the U.S.
    5. We make money off trading, so we make money in a cap-and-trade system: If you’re a financial firm that would make money off establishing or participating in a trading system for emissions credits, then a cap-and-trade system is good for business (but a carbon tax is not).
    6. Green is good marketing: Green is popular. Being green helps sell stuff, even if your stuff has nothing to do with energy or climate. This can apply both at the firm level and at the CEO level. Some CEOs may want to personally position themselves as leading their firm in a green direction.

    Every firm that supports a carbon price proposal, or any specific bill (including Waxman-Markey) will, of course, claim they are noble and altruistic and therefore motivated primarily by reason 1. We can neither prove nor disprove these other, more self-interested reasons for supporting legislation. But at a minimum, we can identify possible additional motivations for the firm’s position.

    In theory a carbon tax could be just as vulnerable to legislative rent-seeking (reason 2) as a cap-and-trade: you could send your lobbyists to try to get your firm exempted from the first N years of a carbon tax, or to get a special rule that would exempt existing power production capacity. It’s sometimes easier to build a coalition by allocating carrots rather than sticks, and a cap-and-trade allows the legislative authors to allocate carrots.

    Note that reasons 3, 4, and 6 exist for any positive carbon price. The form (carbon tax or cap-and-trade) is not relevant to these motivations.

    When you hear that businesses like X and Y are supporting the Waxman-Markey bill, or that firm Z supports cap-and-trade because they care about the planet, run through these five other possible motivations and see if any also apply. They may provide a more credible explanation for the firm’s position.

    Tuesday, 26 May 2009|
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